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INTRODUCTION 
[When it comes to sentencing corporations or white collar offenders 
individually,] contemporary policies ... fail to shame or to show 
community disapproval to any degree.1 
Shaming punishments ... unambiguously express moral 
disapprobation. 2 
1. TONY G. POVEDA, RErlnNKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 150 (1994). 
2. Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MlCH. 
L. REv. 2477, 2484 (1997). 
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[S]hame [also] works wonders in leading a corporation to shape up after 
its wrongdoing has been exposed to public condemnation.3 
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Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,4 when a corporation 
is sentenced for violations of federal law, the sentencing judge may require 
the chief executive officer (CEO) to appear in court personally to receive 
the corporation's sentence.5 This compelled court appearance apparently 
has three purposes: to impress upon the CEO the gravity of the corpora-
tion's wrongdoing; to signify to the community that the leadership of the 
corporation has accepted responsibility for the crime; and to extract some 
indication that the corporation intends to comply with the law in the future. 
The origin of this provision-1'11 call it the "corporate icon" provi-
sion-is thought to be the legacy of federal district Judge Jack E. Tanner, 
and is based on his conduct when he came to dispose of a case involving 
Pennwalt Corporation in 1989. Charged with spilling 75,000 gallons of 
cancer-causing chemicals into Washington's Puget Sound, Pennwalt had 
agreed to plead guilty to a felony and pay $1.1 million in fmes.6 
When Pennwalt' s lawyers appeared before him with the plea agree-
ment, Judge Tanner turned them away, ordering them not to return unless 
they brought Pennwalt' s "top man" with them. ''Who is the corporation? I 
think the public is entitled to know who's responsible," barked Tanner.7 
When the lawyers returned with three top-level local Pennwalt executives, 
Tanner again refused the plea. Only when CEO Edwin E. Tuttle appeared 
in court, flying in from across the country, did Tanner accept the com-
pany's guilty plea. He did so, however, only after questioning Tuttle care-
fully on how the chemical spill could have happened and how (in light of 
Penuwalt' s imminent sale to an overseas acquirer) the people of the state 
of Washington could be assured that nothing so destructive could ever 
happen again. Tuttle, composed and courteous, responded to all of Judge 
Tanner's questions. Later; Tanner recalled, ''the only way to get their at-
tention [was] to make the top guy responsible."8 
Until recently, few other federal judges have thought to employ this 
3. Gilbert Geis & Joseph Demento, Should We Prosecute Corporations and/or Individuals?, 
in CORPORATE CRIME: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 79 (Frank Pearce & Laureen Snider eds., 1995) 
(summarizing the results of a 1983 study of the impact of adverse publicity on corporate wrongdoers 
and their executives). 
4. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (1998) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. 
5. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5, commentary (n. 14). 
6. See Timothy Egan, Putting a Face on Corporate Crime, N.Y. TiMES, July 14, 1989, at B8. 
7. Robert G. Morvillo, Corporate Plea Bargain, N.Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 1990, at 3. 
8. Emmett Watson, Judge Jack Tanner Wrestled Branda and Racism, SEA TILE TiMES, Jan. 27, 
1991, at Bl. 
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emblematic approach to the corporate hierarchy, and the exceptions to this 
rule have been controversial. In 1984, federal district Judge Miles Lord 
summoned three top executives from A.H. Robins, Inc., including the 
company's CEO and general counsel, to his Minneapolis courtroom to de-
nounce the company's conduct in the Dalkon Shield case.9 In 1992, fed-
enil district Judge H. Lee Sarokin personally castigated top executives in 
the tobacco industry for their "concealment and disinformatiou" in the 
course of pre-trial discovery.10 In 1995, federal district Judge John S. 
Martin, Jr., confronted the Chairman of the Board of Consolidated Edison 
Company in his courtroom in connection with the company's failure to re-
port environmental violations. 11 
For the most part, however, judges historically have treated corporate 
chief executives as separate and distinct creatures from the corporations 
they oversee. CEOs are thus safely immune, except in singularly egre-
gious cases, from any thought of personal liability, or, indeed, from any 
need ever to appear at the courthouse. This is particularly true in the case 
of publicly-held companies, whose CEOs are typically shielded by their 
lawyers from any litigation entanglement. 12 
By employing the corporate icon provision, however, a federal sen-
tencing judge can now insist that a CEO become more personally engaged 
in the company's criminal litigation. This personal engagement serves 
several critical law enforcement goals. First, by involving a high-level ex-
ecutive in the sentencing process, the corporate icon proceeding com-
9. "Your company, without warning to women, invaded their bodies by the millions and 
caused them injuries by the thousands," Judge Lord said in prepared remarks. "Your company in the 
face of overwhelming evidence denies its guilt and continues its monstrous mischief. You have taken 
the bottom line as your guiding beacon and the low road as your route. This is corporate irresponsi-
bility at its meanest," Lord declared. Judge Lambastes Company in Suit on Intrauterine Device, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1984, at B16. For this action, Judge Lord was threatened with censure and Inter was 
found by the Court of Appeals to have conducted himself in a "highly injudicious" manner and to 
have violated the executives' due process rights. See Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 
1191-92 (8th Cir. 1984). Lord's reprimand of the executives was consequently stricken from the of-
ficial record. See id. at 1194. 
10. Haines v. Liggett Group lnc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J. 1992), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Judge Sarokin was ultimately disqualified from the case on the grounds that his remarks 
had given the appearance of prejudice. See id. at 98. 
11. See Don VanNatta, Jr., Con Ed Cited in Intimidation of Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 
1995, at Bl. 
12. In a study of juries who heard 36 cases involving corporate defendants, investigators noted 
that "the corporation [was] often a 'ghost' in the courtroom. 1n our study, the attorney was often the 
only representative of the business in court In most of the cases in the sample, the CEOs stayed 
away. Jurors often wondered where they were." Valerie Hans & WilliamS. Lofquist, Jurors' Judg-
ments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & 
SOC'Y REV. 85, 100 (1992). 
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mands the attention of uppermost corporate management. The criminal 
proceeding is no longer a matter entrusted solely to lawyers. Second, if the 
company's control system has been deficient, thus permitting the criminal 
activity to occur, the icon proceeding may highlight the deficiencies and 
publicly commit the CEO to improvement. Third, if the company's top 
managers have been complicit in the crime or if the company has sought to 
thwart the government's investigation of the crime, those facts, too, may 
be brought to light in the icon proceeding.13 The CEO can then be required 
to answer for the corporation's conduct. 
In short, by requiring a CEO's presence in the courtroom at sentenc-
ing, a federal judge can both confront the corporation in a manner that is 
likely to result in some meaningful effort toward remediation, and, at the 
same time, signal to the public that a person-rather than some faceless 
entity-has acknowledged the company's wrongdoing. 
I suggest, however, that the corporate icon provision, as it is now 
written, does not go far enough toward involving top-level decisionmakers 
in the corporate sentencing process. In devising the corporate icon provi-
sion, the Sentencing Commission underestimated its ability to command 
top management's attention and the importance of doing so as a means of 
facilitating compliance with the law. 
The existing corporate icon provision is deficient in three respects. 
First, the corporate icon proceeding is discretionary for the sentencing 
judge. Second, the sentencing judge may require the CEO's presence only 
when the corporation has voluntarily sought a reduction in its sentence by 
"demonstrating recognition and affmnative acceptance of responsibility" 
for its crime.14 Typically, acceptance of responsibility requires the corpo-
ration to enter a guilty plea.15 Consequently, corporations that defend 
against criminal charges and later lose their cases are not subject to the 
corporate icon proceeding. Third, the corporate icon proceeding involves 
the CEO, but excludes the corporation's directors. 
What follows is a simple proposal. The Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines should be amended to provide that: (1) In all cases of criminal 
sentencing, whether or not pursuant to a claim of "acceptance of respon-
sibility," the CEO should be required to appear in person to receive the 
13. Other sanctions may also apply to such circumstances. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5. 
14. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5 n.14. 
15. See infra note 68 and accompanying text The percentage of corporations actually receiv-
ing acceptance of responsibility credit in criminal cases since the Organizational Sentencing Guide-
lines were adopted has been 13% (1991-1993); 24% (1994); 22% (1995); 26% (1996); and 24% 
(1997). See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1993, 1994, 1995 1996, and 1997 ANN. REPS. (1993-1997). 
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corporation's sentence; and (2) in appropriate cases, the sentencing judge 
should have the option of compelling the corporation's board of directors 
to appear in open court (either together with, or separately from, the CEO), 
to acknowledge the corporation's wrongdoing and to commit the company 
to future compliance with the law. 
Requiring the CEO to appear in all cases, including those in which the 
corporation has denied responsibility, will ensure not only that every CEO 
whose company has been found guilty of committing a crime will be com-
pelled to give personal attention to the behavior that gave rise to that 
crime, but also that the community's need for some form of retributive 
ceremony has been satisfied. Requiring the board of directors, as well as 
the CEO, to appear at a corporation's sentencing is likely to achieve two 
additional important results. It will personalize and thus drive home to di-
rectors the reality of their fiduciary responsibilities. This will force them 
to recognize that corporate misconduct is, ultimately, a reflection of their 
choices and actions at the board level, and not merely the choices and ac-
tions of company employees. Also, it will enhance the deterrent impact of 
the corporation's sentence. 
The discretionary sentencing proceeding for directors-for now, I'll 
call it the directors' woodshed proceeding-and the mandatory corporate 
icon proceeding that I propose each are designed to meet the criticism of 
the current sentencing system that "[it] has failed to provide adequate 
means for ensuring that corporate defendants are sentenced in a manner 
directly geared to achieving internal accountability."16 
I. OVERVIEW 
This Article will unfold in seven parts. Part ll begins with a brief 
exploration of the role of shame in corporate sentencing. Recent crimino-
logical studies have recognized that individual shame can be a powerful 
motivator, especially as applied to highly-placed executives, and can have 
a significant deterrent impact on both corporate executives and the com-
panies they oversee.17 Both the mandatory corporate icon proceeding and 
the discretionary directors' woodshed proceeding are premised, in part, on 
the fmdings embodied in those studies. 
Shame can take many forms, however. Shame that merely stigma-
tizes or humiliates a corporate leader may not achieve the desired result. 
16. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 9 
(1993). 
17. See infra Parts II.A-B. 
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What must be sought instead is what criminologist John Braithwaite has 
called "reintegrative" shaming, a process by which a wrongdoer admits his 
misconduct, recognizes its social significance, pledges corrective action, 
and is welcomed back ("reintegrated") into the community of law-abiding 
citizens.18 Reintegrative shaming is said to be particularly well-suited for 
use in sentencing white collar defendants.19 I will argue that it is even 
more constructive in the context of corporate crime. 
I will then tum to the specifics of the icon and woodshed proposals. 
Part ill argues that, as a result of the CEO's inevitable influence over a 
corporation's culture and the special and symbolic public roles that CEOs 
typically play, the corporate icon proceeding should be mandatory in all 
criminal cases. Part IV discusses how a sentencing judge ought to orches-
trate an icon proceeding. 
Part V examines the role the board of directors plays in corporate 
criminality, and the processes by which· directors, as distinguished from 
CEOs, can either stimulate or minimize criminality within the firms they 
oversee. The fact is, corporate directors are empowered to, and have 
available many tools with which to, shape the corporate culture and 
thereby influence the likelihood that corporate crime will occur. Where 
directors fail to employ those tools effectively, they may violate their fun-
damental duty of care. This, at least, was the conclusion of the Delaware 
Chancery Court in its opinion in In re Caremark. 20 It is therefore appro-
priate that directors, no less than a CEO, be required to play a role in the 
corporate sentencing process, or at the least be required to do so where the 
sentencing judge concludes it is appropriate. 
Part VI describes the factors to be taken into account by the judge in 
determining whether a woodshed proceeding should be convened. This 
Part, in addition, will consider the ways in which, in the course of the pro-
ceeding, the judge can explore systemic failures and extract a board-level 
commitment to organizational change. Part VII considers some likely 
criticisms of both the mandatory corporate icon proceeding and the discre-
tionary directors' woodshed proceeding. I will conclude with some sug-
gested language by which both the icon proceeding and the woodshed pro-
ceeding may be implemented. 
18. See generally JOHN BRAITiiW AITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989). 
19. See id. at 72. 
20. In re Caremark Int'l., Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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IT. SHAME AS A DETERRENT IN THE CORPORATE 
SENTENCING PROCESS 
The existing corporate icon proceeding is one of a number of 
"shaming rituals"21 currently scattered throughout the Sentencing Guide-
lines.22 Both the icon proceeding and the woodshed proceeding I propose 
are based on the notion that an informal sanction-such as the shame that 
accompanies a compelled appearance before the sentencing court-may be 
every bit as significant a deterrent as more formal sanctions, such as im-
prisonment or the imposition of monetary fines.23 This may be an un-
proven assumption, but increasing evidence suggests that well-crafted 
shaming sanctions-especially as applied to top-level corporate execu-
tives-can serve as an effective influence on individual and corporate be-
havior. 
A. SHAME AND THE LEADERSHIP CLASS 
The population of top corporate executives in America can be charac-
terized as living in an exclusive small town. As Edward Rock has pointed 
out, "the senior managers and directors of large, publicly held corpora-
tions, and the lawyers who advise them-form a surprisingly small and 
close-knit community. The directors of large, publicly held corporations 
number roughly four to five thousand."24 In such a community, informa-
tion travels, impressions are formed and hardened, loyalties are tested, and 
reputations are built and dismantled, extremely efficiently, often with just 
a few phone calls. In a rarefied community such as this, the role of repu-
tation is significant. CEOs after all, and the directors with whom they 
work, are status-conscious creatures. The reason many of them seek high 
21. The concept of a shaming ritual is derived from anthropological studies. See Toni M. Mas· 
saro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1906-15 (1991) 
(describing shaming rituals from other cultures); Wll.LIAM IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION AND OTHER 
EsSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE 161-65 (1993) (describing the universal 
characteristics of shaming rituals). 
22. The most visible of the shaming sanctions in the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines is 
the "publicity sanction," which permits a sentencing court to require a corpomtion to publish an ad· 
vertisement detailing the nature of the offense committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of the 
punishment imposed, and the steps to be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar offenses. See 
U.S.S.G. § 8Dl.4(a). See also Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment 
by Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387 (199-2) (discussing the 
publicity sanction). 
23. See generally GARY S. GREEN, OCCUPATIONAL CRIME 232 (1990) ("Informal sanctions can 
often be more feared than formally imposed conviction or punishment."). 
24. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1013 (1997). 
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corporate office or serve on corporate boards in the first place often has to 
do with visibility and personal prestige. 25 
Successful executives typically conduct themselves so as to enhance 
the perception that they are wise and all-knowing, that their judgment is 
valued by others, and that they move in influential public circles. They 
serve on charitable boards, for example, and participate as distinguished 
speakers at university functions. Some participate in politics; others write 
autobiographies. Many subject themselves willingly to the hagiography of 
the business press.26 Challenges to these men's and women's reputations 
consequently are not taken lightly-and events that cast them or their 
business skills in an unflattering light may have a particularly dramatic 
impact upon them. 
For example, studies have shown that publicity about corporate 
criminal behavior with which executives have had no personal association 
may nevertheless "embarrass them and their families tremendously."27 It 
may cause them to feel "tainted" among their family members and in their 
local communities.28 It may also cause them to become anxious about 
their chances for advancement and future prestigious assignments.29 
When the executive has played some role in the company's wrongdo-
ing, or when the wrongdoing can be attributed to her failure as a leader, the 
fear of exposure and accompanying shame may take on an even greater 
significance. A number of recent studies have suggested that, especially 
for top-level managers and members of their social class, fear of being 
shamed before their family members and peers may even exceed the fear 
of criminal prosecution, exposure to civil lawsuits, or other forms of offi-
cially imposed sanctions.3° For these individuals, "in the rational weighing 
25. See JAY W. LoRSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF 
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 26 (1989). 
26. See, e.g., The Top 25 Executives of the Year, Bus. WK., Jan. 11, 1999, at 58. 
27. GREEN, supra note 23, at 140. 
28. See Geis & Demento, supra note 3, at 79·80 (Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, in their in-
terviews with American and Australian corporate executives whose companies had been criminally 
sanctioned, found that the executives felt personally "tainted." They recounted stories of "scorn and 
ostracism heaped on them and their families by their neighbours."). 
29. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry 
Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 19 MICH. L. REV. 386, 412 (1981) (noting that many 
people believe, perhaps incorrectly, that "managers identified publicly as having been involved in 
corporate misconduct will be disadvantaged in their opportunities for advancement"). 
30. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 69 ("It would seem that sanctions imposed by 
relatives, fiiends or a personally relevant collectivity have more effect on criminal behavior than 
sanctions imposed by a remote legal authority."); Sally S. Simpson, Corporate-Crime Deterrence and 
Corporate Control-Policies: Views from the Inside, in WHITE-COllAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 298 
(Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992) (corporate managers regard the risk of informal sane-
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of the costs and benefits of crime, loss of respect weighs more heavily ... 
than formal punishment."31 This is why shaming rituals, such as the corpo-
rate icon proceeding or the directors' woodshed proceeding, are likely to 
be effective. 
High status business leaders may be especially susceptible to shaming 
rituals. ''They are the people most likely to worry about public appear-
ances, to be vulnerable to moralistic or judgmental social groups, to defer 
to authority and to be relatively conventional in attitudes toward 'law and 
order."'32 They are also the people most likely to be concerned about 
maintaining the appearance of business competence and professional ac-
complishment. 
Also, because they regard themselves as participants in a "culture of 
honor," they are especially sensitive to the opinions of their peers.33 Dan 
Kahan has described the way in which corporate executives distinguish 
between public disgrace and disgrace in the eyes of other corporate elites: 
Consider, for example, a corporate executive who is deciding whether 
to bribe a public official or to dump toxic wastes. He might not care 
that much about what an auto mechanic in a remote part of town will 
think of him if he is caught and word of his offense is broadcast to the 
community at large. But he probably cares a lot about what his family, 
his colleagues, his firm's customers, his neighbors, and even the 
members of his health club think.34 
Edward Rock has even further imagined the degree of an executive's 
distress upon seeing his conduct described in print: 
Consider how Evans, Reilly, or Wasserstein felt when reading these 
optmons. Consider how the members of the special committee, 
identified by name in the opinion, must have felt to be characterized as 
"torpid, if not supine" by the Delaware Supreme Court, combined with 
the equally strong terms used by the chancery court. Consider what it 
tions as more influential in their decision making than the risk of formal sanctions). 
31. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 70. 
32. Massaro, supra note 21, at 1934. 
33. See MILLER, supra note 21, at 117-18 ("In a culture of honor one can be shamed only if one 
has honor, if one is a member of a group competing for honor ••.. Shame depends on the failure to 
measure up to the external standard imposed by the honor group."). 
34. Dan M. Kahan, lVhat Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 591,643 (1996). 
Though Kahan's description may sound frivolous, the degree of shame one can experience in a busi-
ness context should not be underestimated. Shaming sanctions work because, whether intentionally or 
otherwise, they tend to uncover deep seeded feelings of personal frailty. See Stephen G. Tibbetts, 
Shame and Rational Choice in Offending Decisions, 24 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 234, 236 (1997). 
Shame can even give rise to "fears of abandonment" or lead to a "crippling diminishment of self-
esteem." Kahan, supra, at 638. 
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must be like to live with such a public shaming, to see in acquaintances' 
eyes the unasked question, "How could you have stood by and allowed 
this to happen?" Imagine how other managers and directors, when they 
read or heard about these opinions, felt about the prospect of being 
similarly pilloried. Anecdotal evidence confirms what we all would 
expect: No one, including directors and officers of Delaware 
corporations, Wall Street investment bankers, and Wall Street lawyers, 
enjoys being held up to this sort of public condemnation.35 
969 
In short, shaming sanctions-especially those designed to be 
communicated to the "small town" comprised of family members, business 
colleagnes, and business peers-are likely to be effective in capturing the 
attention of high-level corporate executives.36 As we will see in the next 
section, shaming sanctions are also likely to be effective in changing 
corporate behavior. 
B. SHAME AS A PRACTICAL DETERRENT 
The power of the icon and woodshed proceedings is the power to take 
men and women who typically think of themselves as beyond public criti-
cism and censlire, and subject them to a very discomfiting moment of 
public exposure in the context of a serious criminal prosecution. The re-
sult is what one commentator has called a "reputational rub-off' effect. 37 I 
prefer to call it the "who me?" effect. Recalling the strong reaction busi-
ness executives exhibited when they first were characterized as 
"racketeers" under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RIC0),38 or when American corporate executives frrst were sentenced 
to (even brief) imprisonment,39 it is easy to see how powerful and disturb-
35. Rock, supra note 24, at 1048. 
36. After all, as Stephen Garvey points out, "[a]ll else being equal, however, shaming penalties 
are likely to be more effective in Kenosha than they are in Manhattan." Stephen P. Garvey, Can 
Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. em. L. REV. 733, 753 (1998). 
37. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1477, 1510 (1996). Khanna doubts that such an effect really exists. See id. (citing Develop-
ments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1366 (1979)) (questioning whether, under the existing regime, the stigma of a 
criminal conviction would filter down to particular individuals in the corporate structure). Certainly, 
Fisse and Braithwaite's study of the impact of adverse corporate publicity demonstrates that the rub-
off effect does exist See generally BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPAcr OF PuBUCITY 
ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983). 
38. When RICO was first employed in an action against "legitimate" corporate executives, as 
opposed to traditional Mafia-connected racketeers, the executives' lawyers protested loudly that such 
characterizations were scurrilous and unwarranted. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act has 
eliminated some of these objections. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat 737 (1995). 
39. See generally JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF ANTITRUST 
VIOLATIONS 1N TilE El.ECI"RICAL INDUSTRY (1962); CLARENCE C. WALTON & FREDERICK W. 
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ing the experience can be when a business leader's spotless self-image be-
comes commingled with that of a convicted criminal. It is perhaps less 
easy to see how the phenomenon of shame may become translated into a 
meaningful change in individual (not to mention organizational) behavior. 
There are at least four different ways of thinking about this issue: (1) 
one must consider the mechanisms by which corporate crime is believed to 
be interdicted; (2) one must consider the role of shaming as both a specific 
and general deterrent; (3) one must take into account emerging scholarship 
about the role of non-economic incentives in deterring crimes of all sorts; 
and (4) one must consider the types of behavioral change that shame is ca-
pable of generating. 
As for the first approach, a number of studies indicate that both the 
experience of shame and the anticipation of shame in the future can serve 
as substantial deterrents to corporate crime.40 Many observers agree, 
moreover, that aiming the courts' resources at individual leaders, as well 
as at the corporate entity, is the most effective way to deter corporate 
criminal activity.41 
The second approach to the question of deterrence involves specific 
versus general deterrence.42 The purpose of both the corporate icon and 
CLEVELAND, JR., CORPORATIONS ON TRIAL: 'DIE ElECTRICAL CASES {1964) {describing the jailing of 
top-level executives of General Electric Company and Westinghouse Electric Corporation for antitrust 
violations in the heavy electrical equipment industry). 
40. See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: 
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 549, 572 (1996) 
(individuals' feelings of guilt and shame, and the threat of informal sanctions are "significant deter-
rents" to corporate crime); Lori A. Elis & Sally S. Simpson, Informal Sanction Threats and Corporate 
Crime: Additive Versus Multiplicative Models, 32 J. CRIME & DELINQ. 399, 410 (1995) (subjects' 
perceptions that friends, family and business associates will lose respect for them if they participate in 
corporate crime significantly decrease the likelihood that they will do so); F!SSE & BRAITHWAITE, 
supra note 37, at 12, 283-314 (the negative impact of adverse publicity on offenders and their em-
ployees may be more effective than the threat of formal sanctions in controlling corporate crime). See 
also Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice 
Theories of Crime, 27 LAw & Soc'y REV. 467, 485 (1993) (anticipation of shame is negatively related 
to likelihood of committing certain crimes); Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, 
Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 
837 (1990) (like state-imposed sanctions, self-imposed shame and socially-imposed embarrassment 
can also deter future criminal activity). 
41. See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 40, at 574 ("[T]he perceived costs of punishment, be 
they formal, informal, or based on self-imposed shame, that are directed against the individual effec-
tively deter corporate crime."). 
42. According to one formulation, specific deterrence applies only to punished offenders and 
general deterrence applies to members of the general public who only have indirect experience with 
punishment (observing or otherwise having knowledge of the punishment of others). See Mark C. 
Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deterrence, J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 123, 124 (1993). 
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the directors' woodshed proceedings-like the purpose of corporate sen-
tencing generally-is to change managerial behavior.43 The intention be-
hind these proceedings specifically is to change the way CEOs and their 
boards of directors operate-how they structure performance incentives, 
for example, and how they react to allegations of wrongdoing. This is the 
case not only for those CEOs and directors actually subjected to a shaming 
proceeding, but also for those in the broader business community. In other 
words, one hopes that these proceedings can be characterized both as a 
specific and a general deterrent. Shame offers both of these features.44 
There is yet a third way in which shame can have an impact on the 
likelihood that corporate crime will occur. Corporate crime is widely un-
derstood to be more deterrable than violent crime, and this is true for both 
specific and general deterrence.45 The basis for the deterrence may be 
strictly economic (in the form of monetary fmes). Modem theorists argue, 
however, that effective deterrence (at least of individuals) can also come 
from non-economic sources.46 Shaming is one such source. 
Finally, to be truly effective, a sanction must ideally achieve two 
kinds of measurable results: behavioral changes aimed at remedying the 
harm that has already been done (remedial behavior), and behavioral 
changes aimed at avoiding future acts of misconduct and hence avoiding 
future shaming incidents (preventive behavior).47 Criminologists believe 
that shame-or the anticipation of shame--can give rise to both of these 
types of behavioral changes.48 Though we don't yet know for certain that 
43. See Richard S. Gruner, Towards an Organizptional Jurisprudence: Transjonning Corpo-
rate Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing Refonn, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 407, 463 (1994) ("Federal 
law and the sentencing guidelines impose criminal penalties on corporations for crimes like these not 
because corporate managers caused or promoted the crimes, but rather to encourage managerial atten-
tion to preventing and detecting them."). 
44. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 81 ("Shame not only specifically deters the shamed 
offender, it also generally deters many others who also wish to avoid shame and who participate in or 
become aware of the incident of shaming."). 
45. See John Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, Theory lll!d Action for Corporate Crime Control, 28 
CRIME & DELINQ. 292, 301-04 (1982). 
46. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349 
(1997) (arguing that social influence, as well as economic factors, has a significant impact on a per-
son's willingness to commit crimes); Kahan, supra note 2, at 2477 (same). 
47. As applied to a corporate criminal conviction, remedial behavior might include restitution 
to victims, product recall, or environmental clean up. Preventive behavior might include a corporate 
reorganization, improvement of corporate controls, the establishment of a corporate compliance pro-
gram, and personnel changes. 
48. See Tibbetts, supra note 34, at 235-36 (recounting research indicating that the anticipation 
of shame deters potential offenders from committing a crime, and may also encourage those prone to 
criminal activity to alter their behavior in order to avoid future experiences of shame). 
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this is so,49 there is substantial reason (including considerable anecdotal 
evidence) to believe that the prediction is correct. 
Taken all together, these diverse teachings provide the thesis upon 
which the remainder of this article will proceed: Shaming corporate offi-
cers and directors can be an effective way to cause the companies with 
which they are affiliated to remediate past crimes and also to avoid future 
crimes. Shaming for private officers and directors may also be an effec-
tive way to influence other companies' behavior. 
C. THE CONCEPT OF REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING 
As we have already discovered, "[ w ]ith white collar crime, as with 
common crime, ... shame within tightly-knit families, communities and 
corporate cultures [can be] a more profound deterrent than formal punish-
ment."50 "[T]he nub of [this] deterrence is not the severity of the sanction 
but its social embeddedness; shame is more deterring when administered 
by persons who continue to be of importance to us."51 
In other words, the value of the corporate icon and directors' wood-
shed proceedings I propose, lies not so much in the fact that the general 
public may learn of them, but in the fact that family members and valued 
peers will surely do so.52 Stated yet another way, it is not the immediate 
shame of standing before a federal judge that will have the greatest deter-
rent impact on corporate officers and directors. Rather, it is their residual 
awareness that family members, colleagues, and other corporate leaders 
will have reason to believe they have failed in their leadership roles that 
will give these proceedings their transformative power. 
One must still, however, consider just what kind of shaming ritual is 
likely to be most effective with a group comprised solely of corporate 
elites. Here, I rely largely on the insights of criminologist John Braith-
waite, who has advocated the concept of "reintegrative shaming," particu-
larly in the context of white-collar crime.53 According to Braithwaite, an 
effective shaming ritual should not merely inflict momentary pain and 
humiliation on the subjects. The objective of a shaming ritual should be 
"reintegration"-the process by which participants in shaming rituals are 
49. See Kahan, supra note 34, at 638 ("Does shame deter criminality? The short and simple 
answer is that we don't know. Shaming penalties have not yet been subject to rigorous empirical 
evaluation."). 
50. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 138. 
51. /d. at 55. 
52. See supra Part II.A. 
53. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 55-56. 
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encouraged to "attend to the moral claims of the criminal law"54 and then 
embrace and internalize their communities' behavioral norms. 55 
Specifically, Braithwaite distinguishes between "stigmatizing" 
shaming rituals, which may be counterproductive, and shaming rituals em-
phasizing reintegration: "Reintegrative shaming is shaming which is fol-
lowed by efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community of 
law-abiding or respectable citizens through words or gestures of forgive-
ness or ceremonies to decertify the offender as deviant."56 On the other 
hand, "[s]tigmatization is shaming which creates outcasts, where 
'criminal' becomes a master status trait that drives out all other identi-
ties."57 
Braithwaite emphasizes that reintegrative shaming is likely to be es-
pecially effective with white collar offenders and other corporate elites.58 
One alternative to shaming is, of course, formal punishment. Braith-
waite compares these alternatives as follows: 
[S]haming has a great advantage over formal punishment. Shaming is 
more pregnant with symbolic content than punishment. Punishment is a 
denial of confidence in the morality of the offender by reducing norm 
compliance to a crude cost-benefit calculation; shaming can be a 
reaffirmation of the morality of the offender by expressing personal 
disappointment that the offender should do something so out of 
character, and if the shaming is reintegrative, by expressing personal 
satisfaction in seeing the character of the offender restored. 59 
From these brief excerpts, one can see that reintegrative shaming fits 
quite well into a situation in which executives themselves are not person-
ally charged with a crime, but in which the companies they manage have 
been found guilty of criminal activity. Indeed, the corporate icon and di-
rectors' woodshed proceedings are intended to provide precisely the type 
of reintegrative experience that Braithwaite prescribes. The proceedings 
are intended, for example, to be educative, not punitive, and to involve 
54. /d. at9. 
55. Stephen Garvey has taken a similar approach to the use of shame as a tool of correction. 
Rather than stressing "reintegration,'' however, he stresses education. Like Braithwaite, he advocates 
some form of bilateral exchange between judge and defendant. His objective is for "[t]he offender [to] 
corneD through [the process] to recognize and understand the nature of his offense, to experience guilt 
for what he has done, and finally, to repent his wrongdoing and to seek to make amends." Garvey, 
supra note 36, at 765. 
56. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 100-01. 
57. John Braithwaite, Shame and Modernity, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1993). 
58. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 72. 
59. /d. at 72-73. 
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both "one-sided moralizing" by the judge60 and some dialogue with the 
participants designed to elicit an indication of their contrition. The judge 
is expected to conduct the proceedings with dignity and respect, without 
characterizing the participants as "irresponsible" or ''untrustworthy."61 
The participants are expected in tum to be "reasonable, of good faith, and 
motivated to heed [the judge's] advice."62 
The proceedings will also be designed so as to include concrete refer-
ences not only to the negative aspects of the corporation's crime, but also 
to the socially positive aspects of the corporation's activities.63 The result 
of the proceeding should be a recognition by the CEO (in the case of the 
corporate icon proceeding) or the corporation's directors (in the case of the 
woodshed proceeding) that the corporation with which they are associated 
has violated important societal norms. The judge will then urge the par-
ticipants to acknowledge and "internalize a commitment to the rules"64 and 
will offer some sign of support and reconciliation.65 
Though the icon and woodshed proceedings are not a perfect fit for 
Braithwaite's theories,66 they adhere very closely to his vision of correc-
tional policy. We will adopt that vision for the balance of this Article. 
With this theoretical framework in mind, we now turn to the specifics of 
the icon and woodshed proposals. 
III. WHY THE CORPORATE ICON PROCEEDING 
SHOULD BE MANDATORY 
The current corporate icon provision may be employed only where 
the defendant corporation seeks a sentence reduction for "acceptance of 
responsibility" in connection with its crime.67 As a practical matter, this 
includes only those corporations that plead guilty.68 Whether or not to 
60. !d. at 81. 
61. !d. at 132. 
62. !d. at 131. Reintegrative shaming can thus been seen as consistent with the mornl reform 
theocy of punishment, which "requires that the offender be treated as a responsible, autonomous 
agent-as a being capable of rational address-and not an object to be manipulated through coercion 
and fear." Garvey, supra note 36, at 764. 
63. See BRAITHWAITE supra note 18, at 167 ("[One key] to the art of ensuring that shaming is 
reintegrative rather than stigmatizing [is] ... to leaven shame with praise."). 
64. !d. at 139. 
65. See id. at 55 ("These gestures of reacceptance will vary from a simple smile expressing 
forgiveness and love to quite formal ceremonies to decertify the offender as [a] deviant."). 
66. For example, Braithwaite advocates a passage of time between the shaming ritual and the 
"forgiveness and repentance ceremony .... " BRAITHWAITE, supra note 18, at 81. 
67. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
68. See Gary M. Black, Corporate Crime and Punishment: New Guidelines for Defining and 
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convene an icon proceeding is wholly discretionary with the sentencing 
judge. 
Conditioning the availability of an icon proceeding on a guilty plea 
makes little sense, however. Companies that choose to plead guilty may 
be the very worst corporate citizens who can find no defense for their ac-
tions, or they may be the very best, who forego the gamesmanship of liti-
gation in order to expend their resources on correction and remediation. 
Either way, defming the universe of those organizations that will be sub-
ject to an icon proceeding by including those that plead guilty and exclud-
ing those that do not, may be both over- and underinclusive. A more 
principled approach would be to distinguish those companies whose 
CEO's appear to be strong candidates for a corporate icon proceeding (for 
example, those with a high public profile or some personal role in the 
company's wrongdoing) from those whose CEOs are unlikely to experi-
ence much personal shame from the corporate sentencing process (for ex-
ample, those who are new to the job, having been brought in to "clean 
house"). 
The problem with this approach, however, is that it inevitably will be 
costly and time consuming. It is also likely to result in many more false-
negatives than false-positives. Furthermore, it won't address that portion 
of the icon proceeding that is designed to satisfy the public's retributive 
needs. Even the housecleaning CEO may learn something useful in an 
icon proceeding about the corporation whose reins she has seized. And in-
volving such a CEO will also have some trickle-down value to employees 
whose tenure spans the "old" and the "new" corporate regimes.69 
There are other compelling reasons why an icon proceeding should be 
convened in every case in which, by plea or by verdict, a corporation is 
adjudged guilty of criminal behavior. First, bringing the CEO before the 
sentencing judge takes specific note of the powerful influence a CEO can 
have on a .corporati?n's culture.70 Second, there is an important public 
Setting Fines for Financial Crimes, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1992, at 2, 37 ("a guilty plea is a virtual ne-
cessity [for a corporation] to establish acceptance of responsibility.") 
69. In one recent non-Guidelines case-a case involving a guilty plea to 391 felony counts and 
in which the defendant's fonner CEO was under indictment-the acting CEO was ordered to attend 
the corporation's sentencing. He did so "and addressed the court, unequivocally admitting, and ex-
pressing regret for, [the company's] crimes. He stood as the representative of [the company] as the 
sentence was pronounced. In addition to counsel, he was accompanied by two executives of [the 
company] and two 'outside' members of its Board of Directors." United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 
F. Supp. 287, 293 n.7 (1994). Undoubtedly, this perfonnance made an impression on the company's 
employees. 
70. The notion of a corporate culture is well established in the business literature. See gener-
ally Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. 
976 SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:959 
message to be conveyed when a court forces a corporate leader to atone for 
the social and economic harm her company's misconduct has caused. 
A. CEOS SERVE AS A COMPELLING MORAL VOICE 
Experts agree that "top management, and in particular the chief ex-
ecutive officer ... sets the corporate ethical tone.'m ''Top managers or the 
leaders of organizations shape and determine the behavior patterns consid-
ered acceptable in the organization.'on These executives may set a high 
standard for ethical and professional behavior. They alternatively may 
create an atmosphere in which unethical or unlawful conduct is over-
looked, implicitly condoned, or sometimes even overtly encouraged.73 
Whether positive or negative, the values of, and the role played by, the 
chief executive officer are important-often pivotal-in determining a 
corporation's receptivity to deviant or criminal behavior.74 
REv. 743, 753-55 (1992) (citing references to the corporate culture literature). Scholars have long 
recognized that corporations over time develop not only official policies and practices, but also other 
well-understood noons-sometimes written, often infonnal-by which rewards are allocated, ad-
vancement is detennined, and policy decisions are shaped. 
Using her alternative tenn, "corporate ethos," Pamela Bucy notes: 
[E]ach corporation has a distinctive ethos or "characteristic spirit." Superficial things such as 
the manner of dress and the camaraderie of the employees as well as fonnal, written goals and 
policies evidence this ethos. Additionally, a corporation's ethos may be tied to one or a few 
individuals or it may transcend individuals .•• and even generations. 
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 15 MINN. 
L. REv. 1095, 1123 (1991). 
71. MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE Ennes AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE 
MANAGEMENT 132 (1983). Clinard's book recounts a series of interviews with retired middle manag-
ers who were asked why some corporations are more ethical than others. More than half the responses 
attributed the difference to the role of top management, especially the chief executive officer. See id. 
at 55. When asked whether top management sets the ethical tone for compliance with government 
laws and regulations, 92.2% of the respondents said ''very much" and only 6.3% said "some." See id. 
at71. 
72. CATHY A. ENZ, POWER AND SHARED VALUES IN THE CORPORATE CULTURE 43 (1986), 
73. See HAzEL CROALL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 64 (1992) ("Law breaking and inattention to 
regulations can become a 'normative' pattern within a company, with top management setting a moral 
tone into which middle management are socialized."). See also Ronald R. Sims & Margaret P. 
Spencer, Understanding Corporate Misconduct: An Overview and Discussion, in CORPORATE 
MISCONDUCT: THE LEGAL, SOCIEI'AL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES IS (Margaret P. Spencer & Ronald 
R. Sims eds., 1995) [hereinafter CORPORATE MISCONDUCT]. 
/d. 
When one looks at the underlying causes of various types of corporate misconduct , , , one 
sees time and time again the role of top management and a corporate culture that does not 
deter practices of business misconduct. Very often top management places undue pressure 
for perfonnance that in turn motivates less than ethical, even illegal, behavior by those "under 
the gun." In the end, top management cannot escape blame for the development of a corpo-
rate culture that fosters such actions by subordinates. Top management has set the climate for 
such actions by insisting on and rewarding perfonnance at all costs. 
74. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON FRAUDULENT FIN. REPORTING, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
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There are many examples of this phenomenon. For instance, when a 
CEO emphasizes his personal commitment to social justice, he can lead his 
company to great achievements, while still responding to social needs.75 
By the same token, when a CEO endorses the Ku Klux Klan and tells his 
employees "I don't like niggers and I do not want to see them in my 
stores,"76 it is little wonder that a pattern of race discrimination develops 
from the top to the bottom of his fmn.77 
Some CEOs-especially those with charismatic management styles-
are more likely than others to inspire their subordinates to adopt the kinds 
of behaviors they think the CEO would value. In companies headed by 
such CEOs, employees may come not only to embrace officially sanc-
tioned procedures, but also to emulate the speech patterns, buzzwords, 
sports preferences, or even the manner of dress of the CE0.78 They also 
COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 249 (1987) ("The CEO, in particular, has a 
special role; his attitude, behavior and expectations of others strongly influence the actions of other 
upper-level managers."). 
75. See, e.g., JAMES C. WORTHY, WllllAM C. NORRIS: PORTRAIT OF A MAVERICK {1987) 
(recounting the career of the CEO of Control Data Corporation, who in the 1970s built several facto-
ries in urban ghettos and Appalachian backwaters, successfully trained high-school dropouts to manu-
facture highly complex machinery, initiated on-site day care facilities for working parents, developed 
the PLATO computer-based educational and training systems that have been applied from kindergar-
ten to college level instruction and to hospital and military training programs, and created a number of 
programs, all of which were profit-based, to produce job-ready workers, including individuals from 
"underclass" and prison settings). 
76. Martin Dyckman, Lawyers Can Be Heroes Too, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs (Fla.), April 11, 
1993, at 3D (quoting Raymond E. Danner, founder and chairman of the Shoney's, Inc. restaurant 
chain). 
77. See Lynne Duke, Cofounder of Shoney's Quits Following Racial Bias Lawsuit, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 12, 1993, at A4 (describing Shoney's settlement of race bias claims for $105 million, the 
highest award ever paid by a company in a Title VII case). 
Another case in which the CEO's personal preferences permeated the corporate culture involved 
Astra USA Inc., a pharmaceutical marketing company. CEO Lars Bildrnan was notorious for his 
drunken pursuit of female employees. Charges of company-wide sexual harassment practices ulti-
mately surfaced in the national press. See Mark Maremont, Abuse of Power, Bus. WK., May 13, 
1996, at 86. Bildrnan was later removed from office and prosecuted for fraud and tax evasion. He 
was said to have used corporate funds to pay for "$1,500-a-day hookers, to rent boats they used as 
floating bordellos, for vacations and for extensive [horne] renovations." Ralph Ranalli, Ex-biz Chief 
Seized in $1M Theft, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 13, 1997, at 1. The company itself was charged with 
non-payment of$ I 1 million in federal income taxes, by claiming deductions for travel and entertain-
ment expenses characterized by the IRS as "lavish, extravagant and personal in nature." Tony Mun-
roe, Astra Tackles Tax Dispute with IRS, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 7, 1996, at I4. The company re-
cently settled the EEOC's "hostile environment" charges by paying $9.85 million into a settlement 
fund. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Finn to Pay $10 Million in Settlement of Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 
1998, at Al6. 
78. Sociologist Robert Jackal! has observed that, in the companies he studied, the CEO's char-
acteristic turns of phrases often filtered down through middle management all the way to the shop 
floor. "In the early stages of my fieldwork at Covenant Corporation, for example, I was puzzled by 
the inordinately widespread usage of nautical terminology, especially in a corporation located in a 
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are likely to internalize the competitive values and behavioral practices 
embraced by the CEO. As a consequence, the most powerful CEOs often 
play a significant role in a corporation's movement toward criminality, 
sometimes doing so inadvertently. 
If the CEO is obsessed with profits, for example, profit-seeking be-
havior by lower-level employees may ultimately eclipse honest business 
practices. This is a common scenario.79 If the CEO is protective of em-
ployees who are caught breaking the rules, or resists sanctioning wrongdo-
ers out of a misguided sense of loyalty, his mid-level managers are far less 
likely to manage "by the book" or to enforce the company's ethical guide-
lines. Lax environments can evolve from executive actions (or inaction). 
CEOs whose cultural message is to "win at all costs" often can be found 
presiding over tragically compromised institutions. 
Consider some recent examples. John Gutfreund, until 1991, was 
CEO of the Salomon Brothers investment banking firm. Legendary for his 
aggression, acquisitiveness, and money lust,80 and known in the industry 
for insisting on absolute control of the deals in which Salomon Brothers 
participated,81 Gutfreund ended his career in disgrace after a senior Salo-
mon official was found to have rigged federal treasury bond auctions, 
which ensured that the firm would be able to acquire more than the legally-
mandated ceiling of thirty-five percent of any issue sold.82 Salomon 
Brothers only narrowly escaped criminal indictment for these actions, and 
Gutfreund himself was enjoined from associating with securities firms in 
the future. 83 
A second example is Robert M. Fomon, another powerful CEO 
landlocked site. As it happens, the CEO is devoted to sailboats and prefers that his aides en!! him 
'Skipper'." ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES-THE WORlD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 22 (1988). 
79. See Margaret P. Spencer, A Look at Corporate Crime, in CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra 
note 73, at 30 (quoting CHARLES H. MCCAGHY, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: CRIME, CONFLICT AND lN· 
TEREST GROUPS 218 (1976)) (''The intense desire to maintain or increase existing profits has been 
deemed 'the single most compelling factor behind deviance by industry, whether it be price fixing, the 
destruction of competition, or the misrepresentation of a product.'"). 
80. See MICHAEL LEwis, LIAR'S POKER 14 (1989) (describing Gutfreund's offer to play a single 
hand of "liar's poker" for $1 million). 
81. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR 
NABISCO 325-26 (1990) (describing Gutfreund's role in the abortive attempt to take over RJR Nabisco 
and his refusnl to share work or credit with Drexel, Burnham, Lambert in connection with the den!). 
82. See MARTIN MAYER, NIGIITMARE ON WALL STREET: SALOMON BROTHERS AND THE 
CORRUPTION OF THE MARKETPLACE 14-16 (1993). 
83. See id. Snlomon Brothers ultimately agreed to pay $290 million to settle civil claims 
against it by the SEC. See SEC v. Snlomon, Inc., Litigation Release No. 13246, 1992 WL 114584. 
Gutfreund paid a $100,000 fine. See John H. Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, 1992 
WL362753. 
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known for his devotion to "winning at all costs."84 Fomon was the CEO of 
E.F. Hutton Company, another Wall Street powerhouse. He encouraged a 
"'whatever it takes' culture" at E.F. Hutton,85 and averted his eyes when-
ever thorny business or legal problems presented obstacles to landing new 
clients and ever-bigger deals. Fomon was also known for ruthlessly hu-
miliating subordinates who failed to bring in increasing profits for their 
departments.86 Before being forced out by his board of directors in 1986, 
· Fomon presided over E.F. Hutton's indictment for, and ultimate guilty plea 
to, 2,000 felony bank fraud counts in a massive check-kiting scheme that 
netted E.F. Hutton millions at the expense of its correspondent banks.87 
A more recent example is Daniel E. Gill of Bausch & Lomb, Inc., a 
manufacturer of optical products. Like Fomon, Gill insisted on herculean 
performance in his operating units, and belittled or fired subordinates who 
failed to meet their quarterly sales growth targets. Described as 
"tenacious, demanding, and very numbers-oriented,"88 Gill expected his 
managers to meet his demands and seldom cared how they did it. 
"Double-digit increases were demanded every quarter, every year, regard-
less of local economic conditions."89 Predictably, ethical lapses in the 
company became common-sales were booked before they were complete 
(or even existed), and unsold inventory was dumped on the black market. 
Eventually, claims of fmancial fraud surfaced, customers complained of 
intimidation, and Bausch & Lomb's earnings fell fifty-four percent.90 The 
firm had to amend its financial statements and settle (for $68 million) sev-
eral consumer class action suits.91 Gill, like Fomon, was replaced by his 
board, but not until after the company had lost close to one billion dollars 
in market capitalization.92 Business Week described Bausch & Lomb's 
numbers-driven business culture as a "train wreck waiting to happen."93 
The fmal, and most recent, example of a culturally-influential CEO is 
Robert L. Scott, former CEO of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation. 
"[O]nce celebrated as a visionary reformer of the American hospital indus-
84. JAMES STERNGOLD, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: HOW GREED, DECEIT, AND BITTER 
REVENGE DESTROYED E. F. HUITON 49 (1990). 
85. Id. at 82. 
86. See id. at 64-65. 
87. See id. at 131 (describing E. F. Hutton's plea agreement). 
88. Mark Maremont, Blind Ambition, Bus. WK., Oct. 23, 1995, at 78. 
89. Bausch & Lomb's Distoned Vision, Bus. WK., Oct 23, 1995, at 146. 
90. See Maremont, supra note 88, at 78. 
91. See Keith H. Hammonds, B&L Rewrites the Books, Bus. WK., Feb. 5, 1996, at 53; Kelley 
Holland, B&L Sees the Error of Its Ways, Bus. WK., Aug. 19, 1996, at 44. 
92. See Mark Maremont, Judgment Day at Bausch & Lomb, Bus. WK., Dec. 25, 1995, at 39. 
93. Mark Maremont, supra note 88, at 78. 
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try but more recently criticized for his aggressive tactics,"94 Scott was 
forced out by his board just as the Justice Department and several state 
agencies were intensifying their investigations of overbilling, tax viola-
tions, and Medicare fraud at the national hospital chain. "People close to 
Mr. Scott characterized his downfall in terms suitable for a Greek tragedy; 
portraying him as a brilliant and incisive business-man who was undone by 
his fatal flaws. Those flaws, they said, included an arrogance and aggres-
siveness that permeated the company."95 Complaints circulated that Scott 
had "[driven] underlings to produce 15% to 20% rates of growth. Many 
stressed-out hospital managers [had] quit."96 Those who met the targets 
received substantial cash bonuses.97 When the dust had settled, Scott's 
successor, Dr. Thomas F. Frist, Jr., called for "a complete overhaul of the 
aggressive culture established by Mr. Scott."98 Noting that, as a director, 
he had never been informed that there were any concerns relating to the 
company's Medicare reimbursement submissions,99 Frist promised to re-
vamp the relationship between the CEO and Columbia/RCA's board. 
Not every CEO, to be sure, wields the kind of cultural influence over 
his employees that Gutfreund, Fomon, Gill, and Scott apparently did, es-
pecially in large bureaucratic enterprises. Growth and profit-driven CEOs 
do not inevitably preside over calamitous corporate declines. By the same 
token, corporate crime may occur notwithstanding the rectitude of a com-
pany's leaders and even the assiduous efforts of those leaders to discour-
age criminal behavior. In other words, there is no inevitable correlation 
between the personal ethics or management style of a CEO and his com-
pany's tendency to organizational crime.100 Nevertheless, personalizing a 
corporation's crime to its CEO-putting a face on corporate crime-offers 
a court the opportunity to focus on systemic behaviors that might other-
wise escape official attention. 
94. Kurt Eichenwald, Two Leaders Are Out at Health Giant as Inquiry Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, 
July26,1997,atAl. 
95. /d. at A26. 
96. How Columbia/HCA Changed Health Care, For Better or Worse, WALL ST. J., Aug l, 
1997,atA4. 
97. See Kurt Eichenwald, Hospital Giant, Under Attack, Sets Shake-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
1997, at A1 (hospital administrators and others were able to almost double their salaries through bo-
nuses based almost entirely on meeting financial targets). 
98. Columbia's New Chief Freezes Tenet Talks, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1997, at A3. 
99. See Kurt Eichenwald, Columbia!HCA Halting Merger and Capital Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
29, 1997, at Cl. 
100. Similarly, there is no simple correlation between the personal spending habits of corpomte 
CEOs and their ability to contain costs within the companies they run. See Jayne W. Barnard, Sover-
eign Prerogatives, 21 J. CORP. L. 307,312 (1995). 
1999] REINTEGRATNE SHAMING 981 
B. CEOS SERVE AS A SACRIFICIAL GOAT 
Even where the CEO has behaved impeccably, and cannot be said to 
have fostered a culture of lawlessness, the corporate icon proceeding may 
nevertheless play an important role in a corporation's sentencing andre-
habilitation. The rationale behind this position is that a CEO plays a 
unique public role in a corporation's presentation of itself and may conse-
quently be called upon to do public penance on the corporation's behalf. 
This approach to the corporate icon provision centers on symbolic values 
rather than on any specific behavior of the CEO. It also recognizes the 
public's desire to extract some retributive penalty when a public institution 
has betrayed its public trust. 
The public or symbolic role of the CEO has many facets. Often, 
CEOs are quite deliberately cast as the embodiment of their companies, 
appearing in advertisements, making public appearances, and serving as 
spokespersons when a crisis occurs. They also appear before investment 
analysts and Congressional committees. As a consequence, they some-
times become media personalities or even political candidates. Indeed, 
some CEOs' strong identification with the companies they lead and the 
public roles they are called upon to play give them a nearly sovereign-like 
character.101 This means that like true sovereigns, CEOs may sometimes 
be deposed when things go wrong within the company--even things over 
which they had no effective control.102 It also means that they should ex-
pect to be called to task-at least symbolically-when their companies en-
gage in significant criminal activity .103 
C. THE ICON PROCEEDING OFFERS AN OCCASION FOR EXPRESSING 
COMMUNITY VALUES 
The most important argument in favor of mandating an icon proceed-
ing in every case in which a corporation is found guilty of a crime is that 
101. As Nonnan Pearlstein, Editor-in-Chief of Time Magazine, has observed, "CEO's are the 
closest thing to uncrowned kings that we have in this country .... " NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN, 
CAPITAliST FOOLS: TALES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, FROM CARNEGffi TO FORBES TO THE MILKEN 
GANG 19 (1992). 
102. See Philip J. Hilts, Top Manufacturer of Gel Implants Replaces Its Chief, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 1992, at AI (noting the forced resignations of John S. Ludington and Lawrence E. Reed, 
Chainnan and CEO, respectively, of Dow-Coming Coxporation following controversy about the com-
pany's breast implant products). Later investigations made clear that much of the criticism of breast 
implant products had been misplaced. See generally MARCIA ANGElL, ScmNCE ON TRIAL: niE 
CLASH OF MEDICAL EviDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996). 
103. Cf. Harry S. Truman (''The buck stops here."). 
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corporate crime "violate[s] trust and undermine[s] social institutions."104 It 
doesn't matter whether a corporation has pleaded guilty or not-when a 
corporation is convicted of a crime, a social harm has been committed. It 
is therefore fitting that the top corporate leader be required to confront the 
fact of the company's wrongdoing, and be subject to some public censure 
on the company's behalf. This is true regardless of the CEO's personal 
management style, involvement (if any) in the circumstances leading up to 
the crime, or conduct upon being informed that an investigation of wrong-
doing was underway. It is also true regardless of the CEO's public profile, 
or even of the company's size and prominence. 
It may be said that employing a corporate icon proceeding in every 
case in which a corporation is found (or pleads) guilty to a crime, exem-
plifies the theory of "expressive sentencing."105 Regardless of its theoreti-
cal basis, the corporate icon proceeding responds to a very legitimate 
communal desire to hold some individual accountable when corporate 
crime occurs. It also affords courts the opportunity to begin the process of 
reintegration at the level where change is most likely to take place.106 
Making the corporate icon proceeding mandatory does not necessarily 
mean that all corporate icon proceedings will be the same, or even that all 
of them will be critical of the defendant's CEO. For example, the CEO of 
a corporation that has put in place an effective program to prevent and de-
tect crime, 107 or one that has self-reported the crime, fully cooperated in the 
ensuing investigation, and demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for 
the crime, 108 should experience a very different type of icon proceeding 
than the CEO of a company that has overseen a lax operation; stonewalled 
throughout the government's investigation, vigorously and publicly denied 
the charges, shielded and indemnified key employee witnesses, and taken a 
public stand of defiance toward the government. In the first instance, the 
sentencing judge will have every incentive to laud the CEO's conduct and 
104. Ronald C. Kramer, Corporate Criminality: The Development of an Idea, in CORPORATIONS 
AS CRIMINALS 21 (Ellen Hochstedler ed., 1984). 
105. See Kahan, supra note 34, at 643 (arguing that sentencing is not merely instrumental, it also 
signifies the public's moral condemnation); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in 
SENTENCING 23 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981). 
106. Mandating corporate icon proceedings will also protect judges who feel the need to speak 
directly to corporate leaders in connection with corporate misconduct. As noted above, those judges 
who have chosen to do so in the past have often been found to have overstepped their authority, or 
otherwise compromised their impartiality. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
107. Such conduct would entitle the corporation to a three point reduction in it.~ culpability 
score. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f). 
108. Such conduct would entitle the corporation to a five point reduction in its culpability score. 
See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g). 
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hold her or him up as an exemplar to the business community (in this case 
making the CEO a true "icon"). In the latter instance, the sentencing judge 
will be fully justified in recapping the evidence adduced against the com-
pany, noting the impact of the crime on the community or the industry, and 
reminding the CEO of the obligations of corporate citizenship. 
Some icon proceedings will involve small, owner-dominated compa-
nies and others will involve public behemoths with thousands of owners 
and hundreds of managers. Some icon proceedings may have an adversar-
ial flavor to them (including, for example, victim-impact testimony), while 
others will be notably non-adversarial. There is no reason to imagine that 
one size will fit all in these proceedings. In addition, just as individual 
CEOs present a wide range of management styles, so do federal judges, 
and the format and length of all icon proceedings will be entirely within 
the discretion of the sentencing judge. 
IV. HOW THE CORPORATE ICON PROCEEDING 
SHOULDBEORG~D 
Ideally, a corporate icon proceeding should include the very same 
elements that first surfaced in the sentencing hearing for Pennwalt Corpo-
ration:109 an expression by the sentencing judge of the relevant commu-
nity's abhorrence of the crime; an exploration with the CEO of how the 
crime could have occurred; a discussion with the CEO concerning the re-
sponse of the corporation after learning of the crime; an assurance by the 
CEO that similar crimes will not recur; an acceptance by the judge of the 
CEO's assurance; and an admonition by the judge that the company is ex-
pected to be a good corporate citizen. At a minimum, it is essential that 
the CEO be required to acknowledge the fact that the crime(s) occurred, 
the role of corporate management both before and after the crime occurred, 
and the finding of guilt. 
Each of these items is subject to elaboration. For example, in ex-
pressing the community's negative reaction to the crime, the judge may 
refer to letters received from the public and affected special interest 
groups, to comments made by policy makers and government regulators, 
and to newspaper editorials, among other sources. The purpose of this 
phase of the icon proceeding is simple: to articulate condemnation. 
The next phases of the icon proceeding should be desigued to make 
sure that the CEO answers specifically for the elements of the crime and 
109. See supra notes 6·8 and accompanying text 
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its aftermath. For example, the judge may wish to go through each count 
of the complaint, or go through the allegations of harms to the public, re-
questing the CEO's acknowledgment of each one seriatim. He may wish 
to ask specifically about the corporate practices and procedures that per-
mitted the crime to escape detection.110 
Where the company has engaged in egregious misconduct, or has 
been a repeat offender, the judge's questions may become more pointed. 
The judge may demand to know the details of the company's compensa-
tion practices, compliance program(s), indemnification policy, and policies 
regarding internal investigations. When a company has resisted the gov-
ernment's investigation, that behavior is also fair game for discussion. 
Often, the sentencing judge will have direct experience with the com-
pany's non-cooperation as a result of the pre-trial and trial proceedings. In 
those cases, the judge can explore with the CEO why the company felt 
compelled to be intransigent. The sentencing judge can also explore what 
specific actions the company has taken to avoid future criminal exposure. 
The judge may even insist that responsible individuals be identified and 
their employment status be disclosed. 
Most importantly, any corporate icon proceeding should include the 
judge's extraction of "the pledge." The CEO should be required to express 
some personal remorse for the company's crime, and should make a per-
sonal commitment that such misconduct will not recur. To the extent spe-
cific improvements in corporate practices have been identified in the 
course of the proceeding, the sentencing judge may want to request that the 
CEO re-commit herself to those improvements. 
Should the sentencing judge choose to adhere to the reintegrative 
shaming model (which is desirable but not essential to the icon proceed-
ing), the remainder of the corporate icon proceeding will be addressed to 
absolution and benediction. The judge should identify the praiseworthy 
activities of the company and discuss them with the CEO. The purpose of 
this colloquy is to remind those in attendance of the contributions the 
company has made to the public, notwithstanding its recent criminal be-
havior. The judge should then release the CEO with an admonition to 
channel the behavior of the company and its employees to constrnctive, 
responsible ends. The judge should also offer an expression of confidence 
in the CEO's promise to do so. 
110. This inquiry can include a general examination of the company's compliance procedures 
and might certainly include Judge Sporkin's famous question: "Where were the lawyers?" See Lin-
coln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D. D.C. 1990). 
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V. WHY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, AS WELL AS THE CEO, 
SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE 
CORPORATE SENTENCING PROCESS 
One premise of this Article is that, not only should a CEO routinely 
become involved in a corporation's criminal sentencing process, but also, 
in some cases, the board of directors should become involved by means of 
a directors' woodshed proceeding. Underlying this premise is the proposi-
tion that, far from being "potted plants," or mere "parsley on the corpora-
tion's fish," corporate directors represent the conscience of the company, 
the ultimate arbiters of acceptable conduct and, collectively, the com-
pany's chief law enforcement officer. This special role presents an oppor-
tunity to influence the corporate culture and to set the tone for corporate 
activities that is every bit as powerful as the role of the CEO. 
This idea of personalizing corporate crime to a company's board of 
directors is certainly heretical. I hope to make the case, however, that a 
woodshed proceeding, under appropriate circumstances, may often be de-
sirable and a cost-effective adjunct to the corporate icon proceeding. 
One might argue that when corporate crime occurs, the company's di-
rectors should always be as involved in the sentencing proceedings as is 
the CEO, and for the same reasons-to command their attention, to pro-
vide some public sense of closure, and to extract some promise of organ-
izational reform. Such a position, however, would be unmindful of the 
distinction between an on-the-premises manager and a fiduciary part-
timer.111 Thus, rather than crafting a mandatory corporate icon provision 
that would include directors as well as the CEO in a corporation's sentenc-
ing in all cases, I suggest an alternative: In any case in which a corporation 
is found guilty of a federal crime, the trial judge should have the discretion 
to convene the corporation's board of directors to address systemic failures 
of the corporation's governance structure and also to receive the sentence 
of the court. 
The arguments in support of a woodshed proceeding are threefold: (1) 
responding to claims of unlawful behavior is an essential element of direc-
torial responsibility; (2) shaping the corporate culture-and providing the 
resources for preventive behavior-is also an element of the corporate 
111. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. 
PITr. L. REv. 945 (1990). Eisenberg notes that a typical corporate board does not "manage" the cor-
poration, nor does it make business policy: "In a complex organization concerned with complex 
choices, policy cannot be developed on a part-time basis." ld. at 949-50. 
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directors' role; and (3) involving directors in the sentencing process will 
add to the deterrent impact of the corporation's sentence. 
A. DIRECfORS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES REQUIRE THEM 
TO ENSURE THAT AN EFFECTIVE INFORMATION AND 
REPORTING SYS1EM IS IN PLACE 
Experts have long agreed that corporate directors have some obliga-
tion to ensure that their companies conduct their businesses ethically and 
comply with applicable laws.112 What has been less obvious is just how 
extensive that obligation is, what directorial behavior is sufficient to sat-
isfy the obligation, and what role, if any, a board of directors should play 
in crafting the specifics of a corporate compliance policy. Opinions on 
these questions have evolved in recent years and, like other aspects of di-
rectors' fiduciary duties, there remain some open questions as to the di-
mensions and form of a corporate director's role. 
For many years, the conventional wisdom was that, in the absence of 
some "red flag" alerting them to the likelihood that corporate misconduct 
was going on within the company, a corporation's board of directors had 
no duty to create (or compel the creation of) a program to detect that mis-
conduct or to insert themselves into the processes of ensuring legal com-
pliance. The language often cited is that "absent cause for suspicion there 
is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of 
espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect 
exists."113 This was the position of the Delaware Supreme Court, and was 
widely understood to be the state of the law generally in jurisdictions 
throughout the country.U4 Then, the adoption of the Organizational Sen-
112. See Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1610 (1978) ("The corporate 
director should be concerned that the corporation has programs looking toward compliance with ap-
plicable laws and regulations, both foreign and domestic, that it circulates (as appropriate) policy 
statements to this effect to its employees, and that it maintains procedures for monitoring such com-
pliance."); Corporate Directors' Guidebook 1994 Edition, 49 Bus. LAW. 1247, 1249 (1994) 
(directors' responsibilities include, "adopting policies of corporate conduct, including compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations .... "). Both the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate 
Governance and the Model Business Corporation Act suggest that directors should be concerned 
about the existence and adequacy of compliance programs. See Edward Brodsky, Directors' Liability 
-The Importance of Compliance Procedures, DEL. CORP. LmG. REP., Mar. 17, 1997, nn. 22-27 and 
accompanying text The National Association of Corporate Directors recommends that boards of di-
rectors "ensur[e] ethical behavior and compliance with laws and regulations ..•. " NATIONAL ASS'N 
OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIREcrOR PROFESSIONALISM 2 
(1996). 
113. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
114. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d, 880, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) (utilizing Connecticut law); Wil-
shire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (lOth Cir. 1969); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dern, 854 
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tencing Guidelines in 1991 created significant incentives for corporations 
to establish an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of the 
law."115 As a result, commentators began to suggest that the old Allis-
Chalmers role might warrant revisitation.116 
In 1996, the Delaware Chancery Court issued its opinion in In re 
Caremark, 117 suggesting that, indeed, Allis-Chalmers is probably no longer 
good law. Caremark was a decision assessing the fairness of the proposed 
settlement in a shareholders' derivative action arising out of Caremark's 
criminal indictment on multiple felony counts of Medicare and Medicaid 
fraud. As the result of the criminal and related litigation, the company had 
to pay out approximately $250 million in restitution and civil and criminal 
fines. The shareholders alleged that, by failing to detect rampant miscon-
duct within the company, Caremark's board had violated its fiduciary obli-
gations and should be held liable for damages to the shareholders. This 
assertion placed squarely into question the viability of the Allis-Chalmers 
decision. 
In reviewing the proposed settlement, Chancellor Allen addressed the 
specific question "what is the board's responsibility with respect to the or-
ganization and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the corporation 
functions within the law to achieve its purpose?"118 Noting particularly the 
"powerful incentives" provided by the Sentencing Guidelines, 119 and argu-
ing that "any rational person attempting in good faith to meet an organiza-
tional governance responsibility" must take those incentives into ac-
count, 120 Chancellor Allen suggested that directors of Delaware 
corporations should: 
F. Supp. 626, 636 (D. Ariz. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351, 357 (S.D. Tex. 
1993); Massey v. Disc Mfg., Inc, 601 So.2d 449, 456 (Ala 1992). 
115. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(t). 
116. See Thomas M. Schehr, Note, An Analysis of a Corporate Director's Duty to Ferret Out 
Wrongdoing: Have the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Effectively Overruled Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers?, 42 WAYNEL. REV. 1617 (1996) (arguing that failure to establish a compliance program is 
a breach of the duty of care, or at least should not be afforded the protection of the business judgment 
rule). See also Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law 
Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate 
Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413 (1991) (questioning the validity of Allis-Chalmers, and suggest-
ing that corporate governance norms ought to include a requirement that directors supervise corporate 
activities so as to ensure compliance with the law by all corporate actors, with enforcement by means 
of shareholders' derivative suits). 
117. 698 A.2d 9~9 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
118. !d. at 968-69. 
119. !d. at 969. 
120. !d. at 970. 
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[assure] themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the 
organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior 
management and to the board itself timely, accurate information 
sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to 
reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's 
compliance with law and its business performance. 
Obviously, the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information 
system is a question of business judgment And obviously, too, no 
rationally designed information and reporting system will remove the 
possibility that the corporation will violate laws or regulations, or that 
senior officers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled, or 
otherwise fail reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation's 
compliance with the law. But it is important that the board exercise a 
good faith judgment that the corporation's information and reporting 
system is, in concept and design, adequate to insure that appropriate 
information will come to the board's attention in a timely manner as a 
matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy its responsibility. 121 
Though Chancellor Allen's decision was not appealed and, therefore, 
his dictum on the role of the board in creating information and reporting 
programs has not been endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court, 122 the 
Caremark opinion has been closely followed and widely discussed. 123 As a 
consequence, materials on corporate compliance programs-aimed at di-
rectors as well as top-level administrators-have recently been circulated 
to a variety of audiences. 124 Whole books are now available on how to 
build a successful compliance program, often with special emphasis on the 
121. /d. 
122. The Chief Justice of that court, Norman Veasey, has cautioned that, although Chancellor 
Allen's ruling is "a thoughtful decision . . . it is not a statute or rule, not a holding of the Supreme 
Court, not on appeal, not scacy and not necessarily right or wrong." Corporate Compliance Issues 
After Caremark, CORP. OFF. & DIR. LIABILITY LIT. REP., June 11, 1997. 
123. See, e.g., Board Members, Senior Company Managers Should Consider Compliance Pro-
grams in light of Recent Delaware Opinion, BNA CORP. CSL. DAU.Y., Aug. 20, 1997 at 8 (describing 
the program at the ABA annual meeting) [hereinafter Board Members]; Impact of Care mark Rttling on 
Corporate Compliance is Debated in NYC Seminar, CORP. OFF. & DIR. LIABILITY LIT. REP., June 11, 
1997 (describing panel discussions at the PLl continuing legal education program). 
124. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASS'N OF CORP. DIRS., DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, June 1997 (issue de-
voted to compliance issues); Joseph A. Drain, Compliance /01: What a Director Needs to Know, 
ABA BANK COMPUANCE, May/June 1997; Harvey L. Pitt, Karl A. Groskaufmanis & Vnsiliki B. Tsn-
ganos, Director Duties to Uncover and Respond to Management Misconduct, CORP. GOVERNANCE 
ADVISOR, May/June 1997 at 18 (describing in detail several components of a corporate compliance 
program that should be considered by the board of directors) [hereinafter Director Duties]. See also 
Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Doing the Right Thing: Structuring Board Oversight of 
Corporate Compliance Programs, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, June/July 1993 nt 14 (a pre-
Caremark article suggesting how a board audit committee might internet with the internal compliance 
function) [hereinafter Doing the Right Thing]. 
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role of the board of directors.125 
The directors' oversight duties discussed in the Caremark opinion 
need not rest solely on the foundation of the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines. Several federal statutes, including the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977 (FCPA),l26 the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA),127 and the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 128 also impose obligations on companies to 
have in place data gathering and reporting programs aimed at specific 
forms of misconduct.129 Several federal agencies in recent years also have 
issued policy statements that offer significant incentives to companies that 
establish systems to ensure that their operations are in compliance with the 
agencies' regulatory goals.130 These agencies regularly consider the qual-
ity and effectiveness of a regulated company's compliance mechanisms, 
when considering whether to initiate civil or criminal proceedings. 131 And 
when these agencies settle enforcement proceedings, they often require 
boards to become involved in corrective efforts.132 
The need for board involvement in compliance program oversight is 
most C<?mpelling in public companies. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission has officially censured at least one public company's board of 
directors for failure to take appropriate corrective actions upon learning of 
apparent wrongdoing by the company's executives.133 It also has brought 
125. See JEFFREY M. KAPLAN, JOSEPH E. MURPHY & WINTHROP M. SWENSON, COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PREVENTING CRIMINAL AND ClVlL 
LIABU.lTY ch. SA (1996); PRACTISING LAW INST., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AFTER CAREMARK 
(1997); PRACfiSlNG LAW INST., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HOW TO BE A GOOD CITIZEN CORPO-
RATION THROUGH SELF-POUCING 139-40 (1996). 
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 & 2, 78ff (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
127. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
128. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
129. See Schehr, supra note 116, at 1645-48 (discussing the board oversight provisions of the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act and ITSFEA); Pitt et al., Director Duties, supra note 124, at 18 
(discussing the board oversight implications of PSLRA). 
130. See Kirk S. Jordan & Joseph E. Murphy, Compliance Programs: What the Government 
Really Wants, in PRAcriCING LAW INST., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AFTER CAREMARK, supra note 
125, at 739. The Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice all now have programs offering incentives to 
create corporate compliance programs. 
131. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FACTORS lN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS lN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR 
DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR (1991), in RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRlME AND 
SENTENCING app. F (1994); Gruner, supra note 43, at 431. 
132. See Jordan & Murphy, supra note 130 at 739 (enumerating several recent consent decrees 
that included specific provisions regarding the role of directors). 
133. See Cooper Companies, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-35082 (1994) (finding that 
Cooper's board had failed to take "immediate and decisive corrective action."). 
990 SOUTHERN CAUFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:959 
enforcement proceedings against boards of directors that fail to ensure that 
top-level executives are properly disclosing corporate information.134 
Collectively, these statutory provisions and regulatory actions, taken to-
gether with the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, form the foundation 
for a board of directors' duty to ensure that an appropriate system of 
compliance programs is in place. 
How directors exercise that duty, of course, may differ across organi-
zations. Those corporations in fraud-prone industries, 135 for example, and 
those with criminogenic profiles, 136 may require aggressive and sustained 
attention from the board. Those in more compliant industries, and those 
individual companies with a well-established and proven compliance rec-
ord, may require substantially less effort. At a minimum though, experts 
say that any corporate board would be well advised to be briefed regularly 
134. See Report of Investigation of the Conduct of Certain Fonner Officers and Directors of 
W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-39157 (1997). 
135. "There is considerable evidence that illegal activities spread from one organization in an 
industcy to another." James William Coleman, The Theory of White Collar Crime, in WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME RECONSIDERED 68 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992). Currently, "the industries 
most in need of corporate compliance programs-high risk industries-are financial services, compa-
nies with substantial overseas operations, companies with significant environmental exposure, health 
services, and any industcy that is known to be under special scrutiny by regulators." Board Members, 
supra note 123, at 7. 
136. As a general rule, firms with weak or declining profits are more likely to break the law than 
economically successful firms. See Coleman, supra note 135, at 65. See also Jonathan R. Macey, 
Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 326 (1991). 
Firms with decentralized decision making structures are at greater risk than those with tight com-
mand and control structures. See Coleman, supra note 135, at 68-69. See also Steve Tombs, Corpo-
rate Crime and New Organizational Fonns, in CORPORATE CRIME: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 132, 
134-44 (Frank Pearce & Lauren Snider eds., 1995) ("flat," fragmented and internally competitive or-
ganizations are more likely to engage in crime than more traditional structures); KATHLEEN M. 
JAMIESON, THE ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATE CRIME 13 (1994) ("specialization, decentralization, 
and delegation are often cited as conducive to corporate crime"); Ryan, supra note 116, at 431 
("informational isolation" between operating units may lead to unlawful conduct); Barry D. 
Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 341, 
359-60 (1991) (suggesting that lower-level employees in diversified, impersonally-managed finns 
may be more likely to engage in criminal activity than employees in more intimate settings). Finns 
managed by lateral hires are probably more susceptible to lawbreaking than firms that emphasize 
promotion from within. See DAVID R. SIMON & STANLEY EITZEN, ELITE DEVIANCE 242 (2d ed. 
1986). 
A corporation's ownership profile may also impact on its criminality. That is, firms with a small 
number of shareholders in which management holds a significant percentage of the shares, is more 
likely to engage in crime than firms that are widely held where management's percentage of the total 
shares is inconsequential. See Macey, supra, at 323. Similarly, "small firms," in tenns of the number 
of employees, "comprise the vast majority of the firms engaged in criminal activity." !d. at 324. FI-
nally, firms engaged in "complex transactions" are at greater risk of deviance than are finns that are 
engaged in more garden variety types of business dealings. DIANE VAUGHAN, CONTROU..ING 
UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE MISCONDUCT Ill 
(1983). 
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on the status of all compliance practices designed to satisfy the Organiza-
tional Sentencing Guidelines, especially those involving the discipline of 
employees accused of misconduct and management's response to specific 
complaints.137 The board should also regularly review the company's eth-
ics code and the structure of any compliance program(s), to ensure that 
they reflect current industry practices, new legislation, and the company's 
own experience.138 The board (through its audit committee) should work 
carefully with outside auditors to make sure that they know the board's 
expectations regarding prompt reporting of evidence of misconduct. 139 
"There [also] should exist a mechanism to ensure that directors learn 
sooner (rather than later) about allegations of significant illegality by cor-
porate officers or directors."140 
The upshot of all of this is simple: Corporate boards-especially 
those of public companies-bear the serious burden of ensuring that their 
companies comply with the requirements of the law. Their efforts need 
not be foolproof, but directors are expected to be seriously engaged with 
issues of legal (and ethical) compliance. When their efforts fail, and a 
criminal conviction results, it is entirely reasonable that they be required to 
participate in the corporate sentencing process. 
B. DIRECTORS' ACTIONS-AS WELL AS THE CEO's-COMMUNICATE 
IMPORTANT ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL VALUES 
Another reason directors-as well as a company's CEO-should be 
involved in the corporate sentencing process is that directors play an es-
sential role in establishing a company's core values. Through the priorities 
they set and the reward structures they put in place, directors can do much 
to define a corporation's culture.141 
137. See Pitt et al., Director Duties, supra note 124, at 18. See also JED S. RAKOFF, LINDA R. 
BLUMKIN, RICHARD A. SAUBER & KARL GROSKAUFMANIS, CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: 
COMPUANCE AND MmGATION § 5.06(3] (1993). 
!d. 
The audit committee (or any other committee of the board of directors that the board seeks to 
vest with this responsibility) should undertake a regular and periodic review of what problems 
have arisen and how management has dealt with those problems. Among other things, sig-
nificant breaches of corporate codes of conduct, and the punishments meted out to redress 
those breaches, are matters the audit committee should review on a regular basis. 
138. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, Doing the Right Thing, supra note 124, at 14. 
139. See Richard A. Rosen, Corporate Governance in the 1990s, Part Two: Institutionalizing 
Policies and Procedures to Minimize Risk, DIRECTORS MONTHLY, June 1997, at 6. 
140. Pitt, et al., Director Duties, supra note 124, at 19. In addition, the board should ensure that 
their company's compliance officer "receives adequate resources and support from within the com-
pany and is otherwise adequately empowered." KAPLANET AL., supra note 125, at§ 8A:12. 
141. See Deborah A. DeMott, Organizational incentives to Care About the Law, 60 LAW & 
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Indeed, directors are uniquely situated to influence the corporate cul-
ture, both by direct and indirect methods. Simply by performing routine 
directorial tasks-selecting (and replacing) top-level executives, approving 
executive compensation policies that reward the behaviors the directors 
think most important, 142 responding to external challenges and engaging in 
management oversight generally-directors can convey a powerful set of 
messages. One of the simplest ways a board can shape a company is to 
seize control of its agenda. 
1. The Strategic Use of Board-Level Committees 
One of the simplest ways a board can communicate its values is to 
create board-level committees that represent those values. Many corporate 
boards, for example, have established board-level committees to deal with 
environmental and safety matters.143 Other corporate boards have estab-
lished committees dealing with employee and human resource issues, 144 
nuclear safety issues, 145 social responsibility issues, 146 ethics issues gen-
CONI'EMP. PROBS. 39, 41 (1997) ("[D]irectors are ultimately accountable for the corpomtion's cul-
ture."). 
142. For example, it is possible to base a portion of an executive's compensation on such items 
as increase in revenue, increase in market share, increase in stock price, or hitting specific targets of 
particular interest to the board (in sales, customer satisfaction, or employee diversity). The many 
ways in which executive compensation may be determined is beyond the scope of this Article. 
143. This list includes: Anheuser Busch Cos. (Environmental Policy Committee); Atlantic Rich· 
field Co. (Environmental, Health and Safety Committee); Battle Mountain Gold Co. (Environmental 
Affairs and Ethics Committee); CMS Energy Corp. (Environmental and Corpomte Responsibility 
Committee); Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc. (Environmental Committee); Dexter Corp. 
(Environmental and Safety Committee); Dow Chemical Co. (Environmental, Health & Safety Com-
mittee); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. (Environmental Policy Committee); Homestake Mining Co. 
(Environment, Health and Safety Committee); Johns Manville Corp. (Health, Safety and Environment 
Committee); Knight Ridder Inc. (Environmental Affairs Committee); Nalco Chemical Co. 
(Environmental Compliance Committee); Occidental Petroleum Corp. (Environmental Committee); 
Northwest Natural Gas Co. (Environmental Policy Committee); Phelps Dodge Corp. (Environmental, 
Health & Safety Committee); Quaker State Corp. (Environmental and Ethics Committee); Safety 
Kleen Corp. (Environmental Committee); Salomon Inc. (Environmental Committee); Union Carbide 
Corp. (Health, Safety & Environmental Affairs Committee); Vulcan Materials Co. (Safety, Health and 
Environmental Affairs Committee). 
144. This list includes: Central Reserve Life Corp. (Employee Relations Committee); Rohr Inc. 
(Employee Benefits Oversight Committee); U.S. Airways Group, Inc. (Safety Committee); Westcoast 
Energy Inc. (Environment and Employees' Health and Safety Committee). 
145. This list includes: Boston Edison Co. (Nuclear Oversight Committee); Delmarva Power & 
Light Co. (Nuclear Oversight Committee); DTE Energy Co. (Nuclear Review Committee); Entergy 
Corp. (Nuclear Committee); Kansas City Power & Light Co. (Nuclear Affairs Committee); Nlagam 
Mohawk Power Corp. (Nuclear Oversight Committee); Ohio Edison Co. (Nuclear Committee); Wis-
consin Energy Corp. (Nuclear Oversight Committee). 
146. This list includes: Allied Signal Inc. (Corpomte Responsibility Committee); Armco Inc. 
(same); Becton Dickinson & Co. (same); Browning Ferris Industries Ine. (same); Dayton Hudson 
Corp. (same); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Committee on Corpomte Responsibility); ITI Industries 
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erally,147 and issues related to community relations and public affairs.148 A 
number of banks have created board-level committees that monitor com-
pliance with the Community Reinvestment Act.149 Some banks, in addi-
tion, have created committees to oversee compliance with regulatory or-
ders aimed at ensuring their continued solvency}50 A handful of 
companies, often those recovering from a crisis (and sometimes under 
government compulsion), have created board-level committees simply to 
ensure that the legal requirements applicable to the companies' operations 
are being observed.151 Several other companies-presumably including 
Inc. (Corporate Responsibility Committee); Kellogg Co. (Committee on Social Responsibility); 
Kroger Co. (Social Responsibility Committee); McDonnell Douglas Corp. (same); The Mead Corpo-
ration (same); Monsanto Co. (same); Olin Corp. (same); Philip Morris Co. (Public Affairs and Social 
Responsibility Committee); Pitney Bowes Inc. (Corporate Responsibility Committee); Rohm & Haas 
Co. (same); Unisys Corp. (same); Varian Associates Inc. (same); Weirton Steel Corp. (same). 
147. This list includes: Baker Hughes Inc. (Audit/Ethies Committee); Consolidated Natural Gas 
Co. (Ethics Committee); Essex Corp. (Ethies Committee); Harris Corp. (Ethics Committee); Home 
Federal Corp. (Ethics Committee); Lockheed Martin Corp. (Audit & Ethies Committee); Pittston Co. 
(Ethies Committee); Rohr Inc. (Audit & Ethics Committee); Sovereign Bancorp Inc. (Ethics Commit-
tee); Unocal Corp. (Accounting, Auditing & Ethics Committee). 
148. This list includes: AT&T Corp. (Public Policy Committee); Armstrong World Industries, 
Inc. (same); Atlantic Richfield Co. (same); Bankamerica Corp. (same); Baxter International Inc. 
(same); Chevron Corp. (same); Eastman Kodak Co. (same); FMC Corp. (same); Federated Department 
Stores Inc. (same); General Motors Corp. (same); Great Western Fmancial Corp. (same); Paine 
Webber Group Inc. (same); Phillips Petroleum Co. (same); Procter & Gamble Co. (same); TRW Inc. 
(same); Union Carbide Corp. (same); USX Corp. (same); U.S. West Inc. (same). 
149. This list includes: Abington Bancorp Inc. (Community Reinvestment Act Committee); As-
sumption Bancshares, Inc. (CRNComplianee Committee); Boston Private Bancorp Inc. (CRA 
Committee); First Citizens Bancshares, Inc. (same); First Community Bancorp. Inc. 
(Compliance/CRA Committee); First Fmancial Corp. Rhode Island (CRNCompliance Committee); 
Hawaii National Bancshares, Inc. (CRA Committee); Wells Fargo & Co. (same). 
150. Three examples include: Baltimore Bancorp (Compliance Committee monitors complianee 
with agreements entered into with the FDIC, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, and the Maryland 
Bank Commissioner); Shawmut National Corp. (Compliance Committee monitors compliance with 
agreements entered into with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); and National City Corp. 
(same). 
151. This list includes: C.R. Bard, Inc. (as a result of a settlement of criminal charges, the com-
pany's board now includes a Regulatocy Affairs Committee that will "function with respect to regula-
tocy matters in a manner analogous to the way a Board Audit Committee functions with respect to 
financial matters''); Grumman Corp. (as a result of a consent decree with the Department of Justice, 
the duties of the board Audit Committee are expanded to include "oversight of corporate self-
governance policies and procedures relating to business ethics and compliance''); NME, Inc. (as a re-
sult of a consent agreement with the Department of Justice and the Department of Health and Human 
Services, NME's board now includes a Ethics and Quality Assurance Committee which is "ultimately 
responsible for supervising .•• the company's Corporate Integrity Program, maintaining and updat-
ing the Standards of Conduct, and validating NME's compliance with [the consent] agreement"); 
Northrop Corp. (as a result of the settlement of a shareholders' derivative action, the board's executive 
committee will expand its responsibilities to include compliance with federal law and regulations); 
Prudential Securities, Inc. (as a result of a consent agreement with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the board has added a Compliance Committee, with the ''ultimate responsibility for all 
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some that are attempting to adopt "best practices"-have recently created 
board-level committees to ensure that their employees are adhering to in-
ternal or industry codes of conduct or various other regulatory require-
ments.152 
The decision to establish committees such as these, and the accompa-
nying public proclamation that the subjects of these committees' delibera-
tions are significant enough to command board-level attention, are impor-
tant elements of a company's ethical profile. Decisions to create such 
committees-and to convene them regularly-are very much a part of the 
shaping of a corporate culture. 
2. Other Actions a Board May Take to Influence the Corporate Culture 
Other practices are also available to directors by which they can 
communicate to employees, customers, and the public the importance they 
place on various cultural values. Some of these practices, like insisting 
that the company has a clearly drafted code of ethics, or that management 
implement a coherent and aggressive compliance program such as that 
suggested in Caremark, are obvious. There are consultants who can assist 
in the design of such programs. Indeed, the shaping of compliance pro-
grams is now a vigorous growth industry. 
There are still other ways, however, in which directors individually, 
and collectively, can influence a corporation's culture. First, directors can 
build into the criteria by which they evaluate senior management perform-
ance in the area of legal compliance.153 Second, they may condition ex-
compliance functions at PSf'); Salomon, Inc. (following adverse rulings by the SEC, the board created 
a Compliance Committee which "establishes and reviews policies and their administrntion with re-
spect to the compliance of the Company and its subsidiaries with regulatory and internal procedures") 
(The foregoing documents are on file with the author.) 
152. This list includes: American Wagering Inc. (Compliance Committee); Broadway Financial 
Corp. (same); Fairchild Corp. (Corporate Ethics and Compliance Committee); Guidant Corp. 
(Compliance Committee); Iomega Corp. (Ethics and Compliance Committee); Ivax Corp. (Regulatory 
Compliance Committee); Maxxam Inc. (Conflicts and Compliance Committee); Nalco Chemical Co. 
(Environmental Compliance Committee); Renal Treatment Centers ·Inc. (Compliance Committee); 
Ringer Corp. (same); Shaw Industries Inc. (Listing and Legal Compliance Committee); Theragenics 
Corp. (same); Thiokol Corp. (same). 
153. See Joseph E. Murphy, Corporate Counsel's Role in Interactive Compliance, in COR· 
PORATE LAWBREAKING AND lNTERACilVE COMPUANCE 91, 95 (Jay A. Sigler & Joseph E. Murphy 
eds., 1991). 
/d. 
While not every element o( compliance can be quantified, some--for instance, pollution lev-
els and worker safety-clearly are easily quantified. Others-such as commitment to fair 
competition principles-will require more subjective analysis and greater creativity. Surveys 
of a manager's subordinates to test their training in and understanding of the relevant compli-
ance rules may be a starting peint 
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ecutives' access to stock options or indemnification rights on the execu-
tives' cooperation in internal investigations.154 Third, they may wish to 
consider a consistent policy of cooperation with investigatory agencies, 
and when the occasion for self-reporting arises, insist on prompt action, 
even when management would prefer a more combative stance.155 Fourth, 
they may choose to participate personally in in-house ethics and compli-
ance training programs. All these actions, especially if they are announced 
publicly and made visible to all employees, would send a powerful signal 
regarding the corporation's commitment to legal compliance, ethical busi-
ness practices, and personal responsibility in pursuit of the company's ob-
jectives. And all of these actions also fit easily within the traditional 
boundaries of directorial concerns. 
The point of this discussion is twofold: (1) It illustrates the wide 
range of resources available to directors by which corporate criminality 
can effectively be discouraged; and (2) it provides a snapshot of the kinds 
of issues that might be explored at a directors' woodshed proceeding. A 
federal judge armed with a modicum of information about a corporate 
board's governance practices can effectively examine where board per-
formance has fallen short of best practices and also suggest practical ave-
nues for organizational reform. 
C. lNvOL VING DIRECTORS IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS 
WILL ADD TO THE DEIERRENT IMPACT OF 
THE CORPORATION'S SENTENCE 
Directors who are subject to a woodshed proceeding can fairly expect 
the following to occur: The proceeding will disrupt their personal routines 
and require them to convene in an unfamiliar-perhaps inconvenient-
courtroom setting; it will reconfigure-at least temporarily-the directors' 
traditional patterns of deference to the CE0156 and cause them to defer in-
stead to a powerful sentencing judge; it will force the directors to familiar-
ize themselves with, and examine in some detail, the practices and policies 
154. See Pitt et al., Director Duties, supra note 124, at 20. 
155. See Jeffrey W. Nunes, Comment, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Conundrum 
of Compliance Programs and Self-Reporting, 27 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1039, 1055 (1995) ("[A] director's 
failure to establish an effective compliance program may constitute gross negligence. A director's 
failure to self-report may result in the same liability when the director could have saved the corpora-
tion thousands of dollars in fines by reporting to the authorities in a timely fashion."). 
156. See LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 25, at 93 (noting that "[t]he informal rules for direc-
tors are well defined. Directors are expected, above all, to treat the CEO with respect which means 
not embarrassing him or her in a board meeting"), 95 (stating that "our evidence indicates that in 
many boardrooms important issues aren't discussed openly, nor in a timely fashion .... The biggest 
taboo is against open criticism of the CEO's activities."). 
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of the corporation that led to the crime at issue, management's failure to 
prevent or detect the crime, and management's response upon learning that 
a crime had occurred; and it will cause the directors, rather than some 
hired litigator, to witness and actually listen to the sentencing judge's 
comments, particularly as regards harm to the community, impact on vic-
tims, and the need for improved management oversight. 
All of these effects are likely to be strongly felt and long-
remembered, not only by the persons who are the subject of the proceed-
ing, but also by· others in similar environments who can imagine them-
selves standing in the "woodsheddees"' shoes. 
1. Woodshedding Will Reinforce the Teachings ofCaremark 
Under the current regime, corporate criminal convictions have no dis-
cernible impact on a corporate directors.157 Criminal convictions, even for 
shocking corporate crimes, seldom bring about changes in board composi-
tion, for example. Oue does not find a reduction in directorial compensa-
tion following a guilty verdict. Though occasionally a CEO may be sacri-
ficed, 158 outside directors are seldom, if ever, involved in such purges. 
Indeed, until Chancellor Allen's decision in the Caremark case, corporate 
directors could safely assume that their companies' criminality had little, if 
any, connection with their work. 
The woodshed proceeding will serve to alter this practice of virtual 
immunity for directors when corporate crime occurs. Requiring directors 
to appear in court to receive a company's sentence will serve as a reminder 
of their fiduciary obligations. This reminder is important because the 
likelihood of a damage award under Caremark is remote--only the most 
irresponsible directorial behavior poses a financial risk to directors. So, 
the woodshed proceeding can serve as a low-cost surrogate for a damage 
award--one which burdens directors but not too heavily. 
2. Woodshedding Will Facilitate the Transmission of Moral Messages 
Edward Rock has recently written on the informal mechanisms by 
which corporate norms are transmitted.159 These include the narrative sto-
ries told in the opinions of the Delaware courts, speeches and out-of-court 
157. See FISSE & BRAITIIWAITE, supra note 16, at 14 ("The way in which legal liability is struc-
tured today often confers a de facto immunity on corporate managers, who are typically shielded by a 
corporate entity which takes the rap. This is a fundamental difficulty of the deepest social signifi-
cance."). 
158. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
159. See Rock, supra note 24. 
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comments made by Delaware judges, media coverage examining the mis-
behavior of corporate executives, and gossip. Focusing on the role of the 
courts, Rock asserts that Delaware judges engage in the practice of deliver-
ing "corporate law sermons"160 and that "we come much closer to under-
standing the role of courts in corporate law if we think of judges more as 
preachers than as policemen."161 The same line of thinking applies to 
judges in criminal cases as in corporate law cases-part of their task is to 
send messages to distant listeners setting forth the boundaries of accept-
able organizational behavior. The directors' woodshed proceeding is just 
one way in which these messages may be widely disseminated. 
VI. HOW WOODSHEDDING WILL WORK 
The determination as to whether to require the board's participation in 
a woodshed proceeding will rest with the sentencing judge. The court's 
determination as to whether such a proceeding should be convened in a 
particular case should take into account the following factors: 
-the gravity of the crime; 
-whether the crime indicated a pervasive disregard for the law, or 
was an isolated incident within the corporation; 
- whether the corporation accepted responsibility for the crime; 
- whether high-level executives were involved in the crime; 
- whether high-level executives participated in, condoned, or were 
willfully ignorant of the conduct giving rise to the crime; 
- whether the corporation's top-level executives took appropriate 
action in response to the discovery of the crime (including personnel deci-
sions and the initiation of an internal investigation); 
-whether the corporation's top-level management self-reported the 
crime and cooperated in the investigation; 
- whether members of the board were involved in the crime; 
-whether board members participated in, condoned, or were will-
fully ignorant of the conduct giving rise to the crime; 
- whether the corporation had in place an effective program to pre-
vent and detect violations of the law;162 
160. Id. at 1016. 
161. Id. 
162. As a practical matter, corporations in which a compliance program does not exist, or is fun-
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- the specific steps taken by the board to ensure that corporate mis-
conduct would be brought to its attention; 
- the role of the board, if any, in responding to allegations that 
criminal activity had occurred (including actions to remove wrongdoers, 
decisions about indemnification and payment of employees' legal ex-
penses, and actions authorizing cooperation with the investigation); 
- the role of the board, if any, in deciding whether to self-report the 
crime; 
-the role of the board, if any, in determining whether the corpora-
tion should take responsibility for its crime and seek a sentence reduction 
under the Sentencing Guidelines; 
-the composition of the board (insiders v. outsiders); 
- the public profile of individual board members (prestigious figure-
heads v. publicly obscure directors); and 
- the collateral effects of the corporation's criminal activities 
(including civil suits by victims of the crime, and the pendency of share-
holders' derivative suits against the board of directors or others). 
The shorthand formula for sentencing judges should be this: In those 
(infrequent) cases where there is evidence that the board "participated in, 
condoned, or was willfully ignorant of' the conduct at issue, the prosecu-
tion could of course invoke those provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines 
that permit an enhancement of the corporation's sentence.163 In all such 
cases, the sentencing court should also order a directors' woodshed pro-
ceeding. In those (more common) cases where the board has had no direct 
knowledge of the crime and did nothing specific to condone it (or willfully 
ignore it), the sentencing judge may still wish to order a woodshed pro-
ceeding, depending on the circumstances surrounding the crime and the 
board's public profile. And even where the corporation's directors have 
done everything in their power to minimize the likelihood of corporate 
crime in the ways suggested in Part V.B., the sentencing judge may never-
damentally flawed, are more likely to be subject to a woodshed proceeding than corporations that have 
made a genuine effort to ensure that their employees comply with the law. However, the existence of 
a compliance program-even one that has been determined to be "effective" under the Sentencing 
Guidelines-should not excuse directors from a court-imposed woodshed proceeding if the court de-
termines that one is otherwise appropriate. 
163. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b). Fischel and Sykes state, "[Board involvement in corporate crime] is 
unlikely to occur very often in practice .... Involvement of ... the full board of directors [in n crime] 
only increases the probability of detection." Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 
J. LEG. STUD. 319,324 (1996). 
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theless decide to convene a directors' woodshed proceeding, depending on 
the gravity of the case and other factors enumerated in this section. Re-
gardless of the circumstances giving rise to the woodshed proceeding, it 
should be conducted along the lines of those set forth for the conduct of 
the icon proceeding, 164 and should incorporate similar reintegrative themes. 
Woodshed proceedings are likely to be quite rare. Most corporate de-
fendants are closely-held businesses, 165 in which (if there is a board) the 
board's participation in a woodshed proceeding would have little, if any, 
general deterrent value. But for those companies, especially public com-
panies, in which serious criminal conduct has occurred, there may be a 
strong symbolic value in requiring a directors' woodshed proceeding in 
connection with the companies' sentencing. As one critic has observed, 
though ostensibly about truth-seeking, a judicial proceeding is in fact "a 
drama that the public attends and from which it assimilates behavioral 
messages."166 A woodshed proceeding, like other forms of symbolic pun-
ishments, would simply be a variation on this theme. 
VII. PREDICTABLE CRITIQUES AND A RESPONSE 
A mandatory corporate icon proceeding and the proposed directors' 
woodshed proceeding both give rise to several predictable criticisms: They 
may be unconstitutional; they are merely "retributive spectacles"; they 
may discourage risk taking; overuse may give rise to "shaming overload," 
thus undermining their deterrent power; other options may be more cost-
effective; and neither provision is likely to have a measurable impact on 
lower- to mid-level employees where deterrence would really count. 
There are several responses to these arguments, which I will sketch out, 
albeit briefly, in the following section. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In thinking about the constitutionality of both the mandatory corpo-
rate icon proceeding and the discretionary directors' woodshed proceeding, 
one might first turn to those cases in which corporate executives have in-
164. See supra Part IV. 
165. Over ninety percent of the corporate defendants sentenced under the Guidelines fall into 
this category. See David P. Bancroft, Some Current Issues in Organizational Sentencing Under the 
Guidelines, in SIXTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SEMINAR ON TilE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 
(1997). . . 
166. Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1360 (1985). Edward Rock analogizes the trial process to "a mo-
rality play." Rock, supra note 24, at 1047. 
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voked the fiduciary shield doctrine.167 These executives have argued that 
extending personal jurisdiction over them in civil cases for conduct under-
taken solely on behalf of the corporations with .which they are affiliated 
would violate their personal due process rights. The consistent response to 
this argument has been that the fiduciary shield doctrine does not assume 
constitutional proportions.168 Indeed, it has been abandoned in many 
states. Moreover, the fiduciary shield cases involve the potential for per-
sonal liability for the executive, whereas submission to an icon or wood-
shed proceeding risks nothing more than a transient reputational injury. At 
best, being summoned to appear in a sentencing proceeding can be likened 
to receiving a subpoena to testify at trial. 
A more plausible constitutional argument is the one raised by the 
CEO, general counsel, and a senior corporate executive at A.H. Robins Co. 
when Judge Miles W. Lord used a settlement hearing in a civil case as an 
occasion to publicly castigate those executives for their complicity in the 
company's manufacture of the Dalkon Shield.169 These executives, seek-
ing to have his comments expunged from the record, argued successfully 
that Judge Lord had, in effect, issued factual findings regarding their 
wrongdoing without giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
The Court of Appeals held that Judge Lord's critical comments toward the 
executives had implicated the executives' liberty interests, and that their 
due process rights had been infringed.170 
Four circumstances distinguish the icon and woodshed proceedings 
from the harsh rhetoric delivered by Judge Lord. First, unlike the ambush 
in the A.H. Robins case, notice will be given of the nature and purpose of 
the proceedings well in advance of their occurrence. Second, the icon and 
woodshed proceedings will follow either a guilty plea or a guilty verdict at 
the close of a trial in a criminal case, so that the elements of the crime 
were either admitted or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This is quite 
different from the A.H. Robins situation which occurred when the case 
was settled in mid-discovery when no evidence had yet been heard by the 
court. 
Third, the icon and woodshed proceedings could easily be designed so 
as not to prejudice other related litigation, such as the many other Dalkon 
Shield cases that were pending at the time Judge Lord issued his 
167. See, e.g., Tristrata Tech., Inc. v. Noetreric Cosmetics, Inc., 961 F.Supp. 686, 690 (D. Del. 
1997) (describing the doctrine). 
168. See, e.g., Advantage Lift Sys. v. O.M.E.R., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11355 n.2 (S.D. Cnl.). 
169. See supra note 9. 
170. See Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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"findings" against A.H. Robins' leaders. For example, where civil suits or 
shareholders' derivative actions are pending, the icon and woodshed pro-
ceedings might be confmed to matters related to remediation. Where the 
corporation's executives remain targets of a criminal investigation, they 
may, of course, invoke the Fifth Amendment. 
Finally, the icon and woodshed proceedings should certainly avoid 
some of the more intemperate attacks that characterized Judge Lord's re-
marks. Recall that the object of the icon and woodshed proceedings is not 
merely to sermonize, as Judge Lord did, but to draw specific attention to a 
defendant's obligation to remediate his crime, to stimulate repair of the or-
ganizational shortcomings that gave rise to the crime ab initio, and to elicit 
some promise of more compliant corporate behavior in the future. In 
short, the object is to reintegrate top executives into a culture of legal 
compliance and to improve managerial behavior. That task presents a very 
different scenario than the kind of "stigmatizing shaming" that Judge 
Lord's performance imposed upon the A.H. Robins executives. 
B. CONCERNS ABOUT "RETRIBUTIVE SPECTACLE" 
A more significant critique of the corporate icon and directors' wood-
shed proceedings comes from Toni Massaro, who has characterized some 
shaming rituals as meaningless "retributive spectacle[s]."171 Massaro fo-
cuses on the more humiliating of the shaming rituals-judicially ordered 
sign wearing and the posting of public apologies. However, the corporate 
icon and directors' woodshed proceedings differ from those forms of 
shaming censure in several important ways. 
First, these proceedings will be confmed to the courtroom and will 
not require any public displays of self-abasement. There is likely to be 
some publicity about many icon and most woodshed proceedings but being 
lectured to briefly in a courtroom by a judge does not equate to parading 
one's misdeeds in a public place among strangers, or for a protracted pe-
riod of time. In addition, neither the icon proceeding nor the woodshed 
proceeding-unlike some other shaming rituals-is likely to create much 
of a "spillover effect."172 Thus, innocent bystanders, such as spouses and 
children, should not be made to feel too personally stigmatized or shamed. 
Second, there is little likelihood that either the icon proceeding or the 
171. Massaro, supra note 21, at 1884. Another critic has described shaming sanctions as 
"troubling," "ugly," and a "species of lynch justice." James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflict-
ing Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALEL.J. 1055, 1058-59 (1998). 
172. Massaro, supra note 21, at 1938. 
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woodshed proceeding will raise issues of unequal or discriminatory appli-
cation.173 Both proceedings will be conducted by judges whose cultural 
experiences, by and large, will have been similar to those of the men and 
women appearing before them. Though the power imbalance at the mo-
ment of shaming will be obvious, there is little risk that the process will be 
(or will be perceived as being) a product of class bias or racial animus. 
Finally, the directors' woodshed proceeding is especially defensible if 
the concern is that a shaming ritual is merely a vehicle for imposing hu-
miliation. That is because it will be a shared sanction. Individual directors 
(as distinguished from some CEOs) will seldom be singled out for particu-
larized criticism or shame. 
C. CONCERNS ABOUT A CHILLING EFFECT 
A third cqncern, specious in my view, is that implementation of a 
mandatory corporate icon proceeding or a discretionary directors' wood-
shed proceeding would disrupt executives' expectations of autonomy and 
tend to overdeter them. One might argue, for example, that the specter of 
such a proceeding might discourage CEOs from serving in companies with 
a high risk of criminal exposure, or would discourage directorial service in 
such companies.174 Alternatively, one might argue that the existence of 
icon and woodshed proceedings would stifle innovation and cause CEOs 
and their directors to become excessively risk-averse.115 Neither of these 
claims outweighs the potential deterrent value of the proposed proceed-
ings, in my view, and neither is supported by any evidence. It is highly 
unlikely that the possibility of a corporate icon proceeding (as compared 
to, say, the risk of being fired for poor performance or the burdens of de-
fending multiple lawsuits) will drive good CEOs out of office. And the 
remote possibility of a proceeding such as that envisioned by the directors' 
173. Massaro points out that discretionary sanctions such as those involving shaming may be 
prone to manipulation by judges, as a result of a judges' own prejudices and class biases. See id. at 
1941. 
174. This argument has been made in the past, as critics claimed that constant threats of fiduci-
ary duty lawsuits would drive competent directors out of the boardrooms. This concern led to the en-
actment of dozens of "liability cap" provisions, a tightening up of demand requirements for plaintiffs, 
and an artful recasting of the notions of fiduciary duties in general. In fact, however, fear of lawsuits 
is seldom a factor in directors' decisions to accept or reject a board position. See LoRSCH & 
MACIVER, supra note 25, at 24-26 (Of all reasons cited by interviewees for refusing offers to serve on 
corporate boards, "personal liability" was cited the least often. Cited far more often were such reasons 
as "lack of time," "conflicts of interest," and "no interest in [the] firm's industry."). 
175. See Macey, supra note 136, at 319 (articulating the concern that undue anxiety about corpo-
rate criminal liability "can exacerbate [directors'] proclivity toward excessive risk avoidance, in tum, 
stifling innovation and creativity and leading to a general decline in social wealth.") 
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woodshed proposal is hardly so Draconian as to move corporate directors 
toward excessive business timidity, let alone toward resignation from their 
posts. 
D. CONCERNS ABOUT "SHAMING OVERLOAD" 
A pragmatic concern is that if too many icon or woodshed proceed-
ings are conducted, each additional proceeding may become devalued and 
those persons (primarily business colleagues) at whom these proceedings 
are directed, will cease paying attention to them and will no longer be de-
terred. Professor Massaro refers to this scenario as "shaming overload."176 
This concern assumes that corporate icon and directors' woodshed 
proceedings will become commonplace, and that the fact patterns pre-
sented will be indistinguishable from defendant to defendant. It further as-
sumes that individual judges' approaches to the interchange with the CEOs 
or corporate directors appearing before them will quickly become boiler-
plate, thus rendering the judges' comments unremarkable. I doubt that ei-
ther outcome will prove to be the case. 
First, unless corporate crime increases dramatically, the number of 
icon and woodshed proceedings will be small. At present, across the 
country, the average rate of corporate sentencing proceedings is just 
around four per week, 177 or less than one for each active federal judge per 
year.178 Most of these cases involve closely-held corporations179 for which 
woodshed proceedings will seldom be necessary. And many of these cases 
involve defunct corporations where even the icon proceedings might be 
dispensed with. The geographic distribution of the remaining cases, the 
nature of the crimes committed, the array of industries involved, the range 
of harms, and the personalities and organizational structures that gave rise 
to the corporations' sentences, should all keep icon and woodshed proceed-
ings from becoming too routine. 
In addition, one must consider the role of the business press in dis-
seminating information about icon and woodshed proceedings. Only a few 
such proceedings will receive widespread attention. Otherwise, word of 
such proceedings will be confined geographically, within industries, and 
176. Massaro, supra note 21, at 1930. 
177. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 ANN. REP. 40 (last modified Aug. 12, 1998) 
<http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1997/ch5ar97.pdf> (reporting that 220 corporations were sentenced un-
der the Guidelines during that fiscal year). 
178. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (indicating there are currently 610 active fed-
eral district judges). 
179. See supra note 165 and accompanying text 
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within limited social circles. Concerns that significant shaming proceed-
ings will be lost in the noise of competing proceedings thus seem, if any-
thing, unduly optimistic. 
E. CONCERNS ABOUT COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
V.S. Khanna has argued that shaming sanctions are expensive, in the 
sense that they are more costly to administer than the simple imposition of 
a monetary fine.180 He consequently suggests that, rather than be subjected 
to a shaming sanction, top managers of convicted corporations should be 
ordered to pay a fine based on some theory of strict liability .181 Fining 
would be "socially cheaper," and also "more accurate" than any shaming 
sanction is likely to be.182 
Dan Kahan and Eric Posner respond that (apart from any constitu-
tional infirmities inherent in Khanna's proposal), focusing on bookkeeping 
type criticisms such as these without also factoring in the "expressive util-
ity" of shaming sanctions is "a bad idea."183 In other words, they argue, 
shaming sanctions have an independent value beyond that available from 
the use of financial penalties-they satisfy the public's demand for ex-
pression of moral condemnation.184 
A more straightforward way to respond to the concern about cost is to 
note that the "cost" side of the cost-effectiveness equation as applied to 
shaming sanctions involves very low costs both for the courts and for the 
parties. Shaming sanctions need not command much in the way of judicial 
resources, and they would be less intrusive-and certainly less costly to 
the defendant-than court-ordered "community service,"185 "corporate 
probation,"186 or a court-supervised compliance program187 would be. It 
also would be less publicly humiliating to the corporation (and thus less 
harmful to the corporation's shareholders) than a formal "publicity sane-
180. See Khanna, supra note 37, at 1505. 
181. See id. at 1510. 
182. !d. 
183. Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
184. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1385 (1998) ("Law, in a democracy, is more than a price tag."). 
185. U.S.S.G. § 8B1.3; Brent Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Against Corporations, 
1981 WIS. L. REV. 970. 
186. Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New Organizational Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2028 (1992) (describing the breadth of the probation option); 
Shayne Kennedy, Note, Probation and the Failure to Optimally Deter Corporate Misconduct, 71 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1075 (1998) (questioning the efficiency of corporate probation). 
187. See U.S.S.G. §§ 8Dl.l(a)(3), 8Dl.4(c). 
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tion" would be.188 Finally, a shaming sanction would not involve the vast 
sums of money that would be required to defend against a shareholders' 
derivative action (though submission to an icon or woodshed proceeding 
would not be a defense to such an action). Looking strictly at costs, the 
icon and woodshed proceedings look like a bargain. The "effectiveness" 
side of the cost-effectiveness equation is the subject of the following sec-
tion. 
F. BUT WILL IT WORK? 
A fmal criticism of both the mandatory corporate icon proceeding and 
the discretionary directors' woodshed proceeding has to do with the actual 
effectiveness of these proceedings. If it is true that most crime occurs 
somewhere near the middle-management level, 189 then focusing the court's 
attention on the CEO and board of directors arguably may represent mis-
placed energy. In fact, however, directing the court's attention to the top 
of the corporate pyramid is a singularly efficient method of conveying the 
message of the sentencing court to absent mid-level managers. 
As noted above, the CEO is the single most potent force for change 
within an organization and corporate directors, although more distant, can 
also make substantial contributions toward improving an organization's 
culture. More importantly, mid-level managers are very attuned to the 
shame that is heaped upon their bosses. In a seminal study of the human 
responses within organizations that had been caught in serious wrongdo-
ing,190 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite found that, when the spotlight was 
turned on the company or its top executives, employee morale suffered and 
the problems revealed became a "relentless topic of conversation" in the 
workplace.191 
More important, however, was the fmding that shame generated or-
ganizational reforms. In case study after case study, companies improved 
in many areas after siguificant shaming incidents. Some improved their 
compliance prograrns192 and internal auditing functions.193 Others re-
188. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from 
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & EcON. 757 (1993) (describing the significant declines in stock 
value experienced by corporations convicted of fraudulent acts). 
189. See KIP SClll.EGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS 25-26 {1990); Coffee, supra 
note 29, at 397 ("[f]he locus of corporate crime is predominantly at the lower to middle management 
level."). 
190. See FlsSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 37. 
191. See id. at 35. 
192 See id. at 72, 142 (describing the improved programs at Allied Chemical Co. and G.D. 
Searle & Co.). 
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vamped their compensation plans and other incentive schemes.194 Still 
others revised company procedures to ensure that the kinds of problems 
that had given rise to the scandal would not recur,195 and that information 
about misconduct would more effectively make its way to the top.196 In 
many companies, sanctions were put in place to deal with employees who 
violated internal policies,197 and several improved their employee educa-
tion programs.198 Finally, in some situations, particularly those involving 
egregious misconduct, companies were entirely reorganized. 199 In short, in 
virtually every case Fisse and Braithwaite examined, public shaming re-
sulted in measurable reforms from the top to the bottom of the corporate 
hierarchy. Thus, "adverse publicity played a significant role in prodding 
the company into change."200 
In light of these fmdings, it is fair to predict that the mandatory corpo-
rate icon proceeding and the discretionary directors' woodshed proceeding 
will similarly stimulate useful corporate reforms. To the question, "but 
will it work," the answer is that it should. Let us try it and see what hap-
pens. 
CONCLUSION 
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were intended to be an or-
ganic document to be altered as experience suggests additional ways in 
which sentencing procedures could be more effective in minimizing crimi-
nal activities.201 This Article proposes an amendment to the Guidelines, 
designed (1) to increase the likelihood of corporate self-reporting of crimes 
and cooperation with investigators in determining the scope and extent of a 
corporation's crime, and (2) to increase the likelihood that corporations-
especially public ones-will be more attentive to legal compliance values, 
and more assiduous in establishing internal compliance programs. Both of 
these objectives are salutary and achievable. 
193. See id. at 155-56 (describing the beefing up of the internal audit group at Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp.). 
194. See id. at 73, 141 (describing revised programs at Allied Chemical and G. D. Searle & Co.). 
195. See id. at 36 (describing General Motors' new procedures for handling internal reports of 
product defects to ensure that "loop closing'' occurred). 
196. See id. at 234 (enumerating companies). 
197. See id. at 176 (describing range of sanctions initiated-and imposed-at Exxon Corp.). 
198. See id. at 234 (enumerating companies). 
199. See id. at 141 (G. D. Searle & Co.). 
200. Id. at 233. 
201. See llene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Cor-
porations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 251-52 (1993). 
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The "corporate icon" provision currently contained within the Guide-
lines needs merely to be revised to make it mandatory in all situations in 
which a fmding of organizational guilt is entered. For example: 
At the sentencing hearing conducted pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32(c), the court shall require the chief executive 
officer or highest ranking employee of the defendant organization to 
appear in person to receive the organization's sentence. 
As for the directors' woodshed proceeding, the language might read 
something like this: 
In addition, the court may determine that the organization's board of 
directors or its equivalent, as represented by a majority of its members, 
should appear at the sentencing hearing. 
If embraced by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, these proceedings 
will directly support what the Sentencing Guidelines in theory seek to 
achieve-to "provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives 
for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detect-
ing, and reporting criminal conduct."202 They will also reinforce the 
teachings of basic corporate law: that officers and corporate directors 
should, on some occasions, be held accountable as individuals for the cor-
porate wrongdoings that occur on their watch. 
202. U.S.S.G. ch. 8, introductory cmt 
1008 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 
